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Speech-zilla Meets Trademark Kong?: How the
Hollywood Circuit Got It Wrong in the Barbie
Battle, Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.*
Steven Y. Reeves

**

INTRODUCTION

***

This comment will examine the implications of the Ninth
1
Circuit’s holding in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. that
where commercial speech is “inextricably entwined” with
noncommercial expression, such speech enjoys “full First
2
Amendment protection.” The Barbie battle involves Mattel,
Inc., a toy manufacturer and owner of the Barbie doll
trademark and MCA Records, Inc., a music company and
3
In 1997, Mattel
distributor of a song titled Barbie Girl.
commenced action, seeking protection under the Federal
4
5
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA). MCA defended on
6
First Amendment grounds and ultimately prevailed.
The Mattel court recognized that considerable tension

* This comment is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu.
** JD Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School. For Kimberly my
beloved – you taught me the Power of Two, and for Young-mi, my mother –
you taught me everything else.
*** “With Big Chief tablet readied, thick black pencil in hand, and a devilmay-care laugh in the face of death, life on the razor’s edge sense of
exhilaration, the [author] begins.” Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., Inc., 147
F. Supp. 2d 668, 670 (S.D.Tex. 2001) (Kent, District Judge, demonstrating the
importance of humor in legal analysis).
1. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), cert
denied 2003 WL 167680 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2003).
2. Id. at 906. The text of the First Amendment protecting speech states,
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
3. The Mattel court noted that “[i]f this were a sci-fi melodrama, it might
be called Speech-Zilla meets Trademark Kong.” Mattel, 296 F.3d at 898.
4. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1125(c), 1127 (2000))
5. See Mattel, 296 F.3d. at 902. Congress enacted the FTDA in 1995 to
amend the Lanham Act to recognize trademark dilution. See id. at 903.
6. See id. at 903.
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exists between the First Amendment and the protection offered
by the FTDA. The court went as far as remarking that a
dilution injunction against purely commercial speech may “run
7
afoul of the First Amendment.” In essence, the court found
that the First Amendment rights of junior trademark users
could overcome FTDA rights held by senior markholders
regardless of the junior user’s dilutitive commercial motive.
Where did this come from? Under a recent Supreme Court
opinion, commercial speech may deserve almost or as much
8
protection as noncommercial speech. Thus, the Mattel court
may have had a point.
If none of the Mattel court’s reasoning until this point is
doctrinally wrong, what is the danger? At the outset, this note
is not disputing the specific decision of the Mattel court that
MCA Records was entitled to market and sell copies of the song
9
Barbie Girl. Clearly, the song itself, and other types of speech
like it deserve full First Amendment protection. Rather, this
comment discusses the sweeping scope of the Mattel court’s
trademark dilution analysis. Specifically, the court found that
MCA’s use of the Barbie mark was, in fact, dilution by blurring
10
under the FTDA. However, the court also found that MCA’s
dilutitive use was protected under the noncommercial use
11
exception as provided in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B). The key
issue analyzed by the court, and the issue on which this
comment focuses, is the intersection between trademark
dilution rights and commercial or non-commercial use of
trademarks in speech, and how the FTDA’s exceptions and
limitations should be applied by future courts. Because the
Mattel court failed to fully analyze Mattel’s dilution injury, the
court found that First Amendment concerns precluded Mattel’s
FTDA claims by reason of the noncommercial use exception.
This comment contends that the Ninth Circuit’s holding, if
followed to its logical conclusion, heralds the end of the bulk of
the substantive protection afforded by the FTDA.
This

7. Id. at 905-06 n.6.
8. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech:
The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 160; see also, City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993) (stating that
“we are unwilling to recognize Cincinnati’s bare assertion that the ‘low value’
of commercial speech is a sufficient justification for its selective and
categorical ban . . . “).
9. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 907.
10. See id. at 904 n.5.
11. See id. at 907.
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comment argues that if the Mattel court’s treatment of the
FTDA is followed, many FTDA defendants will soon be crying
out for protection of their First Amendment rights through the
noncommercial use exception.
This hypothesis is best illustrated by example. Imagine
American Standard (a manufacturer of plumbing products)
advertises its top shelf line of products as “the Cadillac of
toilets” and employs a visual mark substantially similar to the
Cadillac trademark shield and wreath on its packaging and
advertisements.
May Cadillac obtain a direct-trademarkinfringement injunction under the Lanham Act to prevent
12
Assume
American Standard from using its similar mark?
consumers would not think Cadillac is suddenly making toilets.
Direct-trademark-infringement injunctions require a showing
13
of likelihood of confusion. As a result, American Standard (a
“junior user”) could successfully argue there is little to no
likelihood of confusion between American Standard products
and Cadillac automobiles. Thus, a trademark infringement
suit would not protect Cadillac.
Unfortunately for Cadillac, American Standard’s use of
Cadillac’s mark presents an additional problem: eventually the
Cadillac mark would evoke the image of a toilet—not a luxury
14
car—in the minds of some consumers. Under the FTDA, there
is no need to show a likelihood of confusion, mistake or
15
deception. Furthermore, the FTDA does not require that the
16
products be in competition with each other.
The use of

12. Assume for the sake of argument that Cadillac can successfully defend
the trademark status of its name and service mark.
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000).
14. Assuming that there is no likelihood of confusion between Cadillac
products and the source of American Standard’s toilets, the possibility that
there might be consumer fraud and deceit is irrelevant. Furthermore, assume
for the purpose of argument that the Cadillac mark has achieved
“Supermark”-like status sufficiently famous for purposes of the FTDA. See 2
JEROME GILSON ET. AL., TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5A.01[4][a]
(2002) (defining “Supermarks” as “truly well-known and distinctive . . .
recognize[able] by their powerful consumer product brand name association”).
15. See 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2000) (defining dilution as “the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,
regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between owner of the
famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or
deception”).
16. See id. The lack of any relationship between the products is
particularly interesting because it is evidence of the FTDA’s attempt to protect
the goodwill associated with a mark, regardless of the competitive positions
between the products.
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Cadillac’s trademark shield would be a typical example of
17
trademark dilution, in that a junior use could “weaken the
18
‘commercial magnetism’” of the senior mark. As stated by the
Court in Mattel, “[t]he distinctiveness of the mark is
diminished if the mark no longer brings to mind the senior user
19
alone.” Thus, a dilution injunction appears likely. Indeed this
is exactly the sort of action that dilution theory envisions.
However, an admittedly tenuous First Amendment
argument exists that the freedom to extol the virtues of
American Standard products and the values such products
espouse is within the scope of protected commercial speech.
American Standard could claim that its speech has a socio20
political component and associating its toilets with Cadillac
would emphasize the American origination of its products and
its view that such products should be “made in the good ol’ U.S.
of A.” American Standard, under Mattel, could argue that
because there is some minimal non-commercial expressive
commentary emanating from the Cadillac trademark shield, an
FTDA dilution injunction is precluded on the ground that the
injunction would violate American Standard’s First
Amendment rights. Essentially, American Standard’s position
would be that their message of American origination, personal
luxury consumerism, or similar values it perceives in Cadillac’s
brand image are messages inextricably entwined with
American Standard’s commercial message to “buy our toilets.”
American Standard would then argue that Cadillac consumers
will not be confused about the source of the toilets. Thus, there
is no protectable consumer fraud – only Cadillac’s desire to
protect its mark is at stake. Therefore, American Standard
would conclude that it should be allowed to use the Cadillac
trademark on its packaging simply as a platform to express its
eco-socio-political views. Given the fact that information
regarding economic decisions is on par with information needed
21
suppression of American
to make political decisions,

17. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (observing that “the use of DUPONT shoes, BUICK
aspirin, and KODAK pianos would be actionable under . . .[the FTDA]
legislation”).
18. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903. “To be dilutitive, use of the mark need not
bring to mind the junior user alone.” Id. at 904.
19. Id. at 904.
20. There might be other precision-engineered German toilets, and
cheaper but equally luxurious (if less soulful) Japanese toilets in this market.
21. Cf. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48

2003]

SPEECH-ZILLA MEETS TRADEMARK KONG?

289

Standard’s views could constitute suppression of political
information. This comment discusses how the FTDA should be
wielded in order to protect the legitimate interests of famous
mark holders. This comment is not about the constitutional
scope of Commercial Speech doctrine. Instead, it will examine
the implications of Mattel to owners of so called
22
As demonstrated by the Cadillac example
“Supermarks.”
above, the Mattel court’s hasty decision to confer First
Amendment protection to commercial speech that is
inextricably entwined with non-commercial speech led it to an
unwieldy conclusion. Properly defining the scope of the noncommercial use exception is therefore essential to protecting
owners of famous trademarks.
In Section I, this comment will examine the history of
trademark dilution theory to emphasize that dilution theory
protects the mark holder’s investment in that mark. Section I
will also discuss the FTDA and its individual structure and
provisions. Section I will conclude by briefly exploring the
commercial speech doctrine to show that the current status of
commercial speech compared to non-commercial speech is
unclear. Section II will discuss the Mattel decision itself.
Finally, section III contends that the Mattel court’s analysis of
the FTDA’s intersection with the commercial speech doctrine is

UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (2000). Post discusses in general the distinctions and
boundaries between Commercial Speech and Public discourse. Although Post
concludes that the distinction lies in the information function of public
discourse, he does make the argument that an advertisement of commercial
prices plays as important a role in information dissemination as a newspaper
editorial:
A newspaper editorial discussing drug prices would be protected as
public discourse, because it would be regarded as an effort to
participate in this public communicative sphere in a manner that
enacts the constitutional value of democratic self-governance. A
pharmacist advertising drug prices in that same newspaper, however,
would not be regarded as a participant in public discourse, because
her speech would not be deemed to enact the value of democratic selfgovernance. Nevertheless the pharmacist’s advertisement, no less
than the newspaper’s editorial, would disseminate information to the
public at large and in this way serve the important constitutional
function of sustaining the public communicative sphere. This is an
essential insight of commercial speech doctrine.
Id. Cf. William Safire, In Material Breech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at A25
(arguing that the upcoming U.N. decision to hold Iraq “in material breach” of
armaments agreements is based on economic considerations, rather than on
moral or human rights grounds).
22. See GILSON, supra note 14. For a non-exhaustive but informative list
of potential “Supermarks,” see THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS
2003, at 718-19.
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fundamentally flawed, even though the result produced is
correct.
Furthermore, this section will argue that the
implications of the court’s flawed analysis are far reaching
because the First Amendment becomes an overly powerful
defensive tool against trademark dilution claims. In effect, the
23
Mattel decision may marginalize the “landmark upgrade” the
FTDA has given senior mark holders seeking to protect their
investment.
The position of this comment is that the Mattel court
should have fully analyzed both types of dilution injury,
blurring and tarnishment, because each type of dilution may
invoke different levels of First Amendment protection.
Furthermore, the court should have recognized that MCA’s
First Amendment rights heavily outweighed Mattel’s
tarnishment claims. If the court had adopted this analysis,
future FTDA claimants primarily alleging blurring injuries
could show that the junior user’s First Amendment commercial
speech concerns were not substantial enough to overcome a
senior mark holder’s FTDA rights.
Using the Cadillac
hypothetical, American Standard’s argument that it is using
Cadillac’s mark to espouse socio-political views would fail
because Cadillac’s interest in its mark is substantially more
significant that American Standard’s interest in using the
Cadillac mark to represent its views. This comment concludes,
in any event, the Ninth Circuit’s holding that when commercial
and non-commercial speech is “inextricably entwined,” should
be construed narrowly. Any other reading would render FTDA
rights insignificant because the First Amendment will be a
slam-dunk defense for almost any FTDA defendant.
I. BACKGROUND
A. ORIGINS OF TRADEMARK DILUTION
The key to understanding trademark dilution lies in the
reader’s appreciation for the historical impetus behind dilution
theory. Trademark law in the United States is a relatively
24
recent phenomenon. Dilution theory appeared in the United

23. GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[1].
24. See Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the
Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 797-98
(1997) (according to Klieger, trademarks did not become essential to commerce
until the industrial revolution.
Furthermore, Congress did not enact
trademark legislation until 1870). Klieger argues that protecting marks from
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25

States in 1927, when Frank Schechter published a new theory
26
for dilution as a cause of action. Schechter argued that the
then-current focus on preventing consumer confusion as a
27
rationale for trademark protection should be dropped in favor
28
of protection based on the uniqueness of the mark. Schechter
claimed that the “real injury” to mark holders resulting from
use of “similar marks on non-competing goods” was the
“gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold
29
Schechter’s uniqueness theory has
upon the public mind.”
been characterized as a “radical business-friendly alternative to
consumer confusion, . . . [that] redefined trademark rights as in
gross property rights and infringement actions as
30
misappropriation actions.”

dilution increases barriers to competition and that dilution laws are
anticompetitive. Id. at 860-63. Klieger’s argument is not without merit, but is
beyond the scope of this article. However, Klieger’s extensive examination of
the historical origin of trademark dilution law and the economic value of
trademarks is invaluable. Thus, Klieger’s article is generally cited throughout
with this contradiction in mind. After the first federal trademark legislation
was enacted in 1870, the United States Supreme Court declared the statute
unconstitutional in the Trade-Mark Cases. See id. at 798 (citing 100 U.S. 82,
99 (1879)).
In 1881, Congress tried again, permitting registration to
trademarks used in commerce with foreign nations and Indian tribes, but
without a provision for registration of marks used in interstate commerce. Id.
(citing Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, 502). It was not until the
Trademark Act of 1905 that a federal registration scheme affected marks used
in interstate commerce. See id. (citing Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat.
724). The 1905 Act was in effect until the Lanham Act, the modern federal
trademark statute, was enacted in 1946. See id. (citing Lanham Trade-Mark
Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. 1996))).
25. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 801 (noting that “[d]ilution theory
originated in Frank Schechter’s 1927 article The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection”). Trademark dilution theory first appeared in Germany. See id. at
805-06. For a more extensive discussion of the German origins of trademark
dilution theory, see generally TONY MARTINO, TRADEMARK DILUTION, 4-6
(1996) (citing the German Odol case).
26. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,
40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927).
27. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 796. But see Schechter, supra note 26,
at 814 (noting that “[i]t has been repeatedly pointed out by the very courts
that insist on defining trademarks in terms of ownership or origin that . . . the
source or origin of the goods bearing a well known trademark is seldom known
to the consumer”).
28. See Schechter, supra note 26, at 831 (insisting that “the preservation
of the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for
its protection”).
29. Schechter, supra note 26, at 825.
30. Klieger, supra note 24, at 805-06.
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Schechter’s uniqueness rationale for trademark dilution
was attractive, in part, because of the pressure generated by
the rapid expansion of trade at the end of the nineteenth
31
However, Schechter’s new theory, based on
century.
32
protecting a mark’s uniqueness, was premature. Indeed, just
one year after Schechter’s article, the Second Circuit
acknowledged that the consumer confusion rationale extended
33
In 1946, the consumer confusion
to dissimilar goods.
rationale for trademark protection was formally adopted by the
34
Lanham Act, which prohibited the use of a trademark that is
35
“likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”
Thus, at least on the federal level, Schechter’s theory was
36
ignored.
However, the general idea that unique “trademark[s] may
37
be weakened or reduced by unapproved uses” lived on through
38
39
various state “anti-dilution” statutes.
As the twentieth

31. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 853-54. Klieger noted that “[a]s product
choices [during the Industrial Revolution] expanded and retailers became
middlemen in market transactions, producers and consumers came to rely on
trademarks. . . .” Id. at 854.
32. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 807-08. Klieger explained that:
In the two decades immediately following Schechter’s dilution
proposal, courts, and eventually Congress, eliminated the direct
competition requirement that had prevented trademark law from
matching trade realities. By the second half of the twentieth century,
few could question the degree to which the consumer confusion test
protected the source and quality identification functions of
trademarks and, at least indirectly, safeguarded trademarks’
advertising function as well.
Id. at 808.
33. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 808 (citing Yale Electric Corp. v.
Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928) (stating “[a]nd so it has come to be
recognized that, unless the borrower’s use is so foreign to the owner’s as to
insure against any identification of the two, it is unlawful”)).
34. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000)).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000).
36. See Natalie A. Dopson, Note, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act and
Its Effect on Parody: No Laughing Matter, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 539, 545
(1998).
37. Id. at 542.
38. GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[1] n.1. Gilson notes that these laws
were originally called “anti-dilution” statutes because they were against
dilution, but under the FTDA the “anti” was eliminated, even though some
courts continue to refer to such statutes as “anti-dilution.”
39. See Dopson, supra note 36, at 545-46. Dopson chronicles the early
state anti-dilution statutes, beginning with a Massachusetts statute, Act of
May 2, 1947, ch. 307, §7(a), enacted one year after the Lanham Act. Id.
Dopson notes that “in 1964, the United States Trademark Association
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century American economy progressed from an agrarian to
industrial base, the reliance on and use of trademarks became
40
more widespread and frequent.
Manufacturers (trademark
holders) increasingly sold their goods at a regional or national
41
level. Manufacturers relied more on their marks for source
identification purposes and sought protection for their unique
42
marks by preventing unauthorized uses. Unfortunately, the
“patch-quilt system of protection” provided by existing state
anti-dilution laws led to inconsistent protection for these
43
manufacturers. In addition, the expanding number of state
anti-dilution statutes was often “curiously misconstrued and
44
Those courts often required a
emasculated by the courts.”
showing of likelihood of confusion even though a hallmark of
45
dilution theory is an absence of consumer confusion.

included dilution in its Model State Trademark Bill” and that by 1996 when
the FTDA was enacted, “28 states had adopted anti-dilution statutes.” Id. at
546.
40. See Anthony Pearson, Note, Commercial Trademark Parody, The
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, and the First Amendment, 32 VAL. U. L. REV.
973, 983 n.66 (1998); and Klieger, supra note 24, at 853-54.
41. See Pearson, supra note 40, at 983.
42. See id.
43. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030. The House Judiciary Committee noted that court
decisions have been “inconsistent and some courts are reluctant to grant
Id. at 3-4.
nationwide injunctions for violations of state law. . . .”
Furthermore, the Committee disapprovingly noted that the inconsistencies
“simply encourage[d] forum-shopping and increase[d] the amount of
litigation.” Id. at 4.
44. JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 689 (3rd ed. 2001). Ginsburg refers here to the
confusion often seen between trademark infringement and trademark dilution
actions. Courts often insisted that a plaintiff show a likelihood of confusion in
a dilution action. See id. at 689-90. Ginsburg asserts that this view was
incorrect and that “[n]umerous opinions since [Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied
Mech. Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977)] have noted the prevalent
errors of prior opinions, particularly those which required a likelihood of
confusion.” Id. at 690.
45. See Schechter, supra note 26, at 821-22. Schechter argues:
No necessity or justification for the protection of marks on noncompeting goods is seen except (1) where, while there is no actual
diversion of trade, there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of
the infringing goods; (2) where the use of the infringing mark or name
may work some discredit and financial liability or other similar
concrete injury on the plaintiff. Thus, a recent writer states:
Where there are no circumstances that would cause the public
to think the products bearing the same name were made by the
same party, no wrong is done. The classic example given in
Ainswortlh v. Walmsley: “If he does not carry on a trade in iron,
but carries on a trade in linen and stamps a lion on his linen,

294

MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 4:285

In 1977, the New York Court of Appeals in Allied
46
Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., reversed
the course of common judicial interpretation of the dilution
47
The Allied Maintenance court defined dilution as
concept.
“the whittling away of an established trade-mark’s selling
power and value through its unauthorized use by others upon
48
dissimilar products.” This definition is remarkably similar to
Frank Schechter’s uniqueness concept and was founded on a
49
belief in the property-like value of unique trademarks. More
importantly, the Allied Maintenance court explicitly noted that
a dilution injunction could be had even in the absence of a
50
The Allied
showing of “competition or confusion.”

another person may stamp a lion on iron,” is still the law.

This conclusion that “no wrong is done” is based upon an archaic
notion of the function of a trademark as solely indicating “source or
origin.” It assumes that “the elementary equitable principle upon
which the whole law of this subject is based . . . is that one may not
palm off his goods as the goods of another” and that the sole injury
resulting from the use of the same “lion” mark on linen and iron
might be a confusion as to the source of these two dissimilar products.
It ignores the fact that the creation and retention of custom, rather
than the designation of source, is the primary purpose of the
trademark today, and that the preservation of the uniqueness or
individuality of the trademark is of paramount importance to its
owner.
Id. (emphasis in original).
46. 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977).
47. See GINSBURG, supra note 44, at 689-90; see Allied Maint., 369 N.E.2d
at 1165 (noting that “[g]enerally, courts which have had the opportunity to
interpret an anti-dilution statute have refused to apply its provisions
literally . . . [and] have read into the statute a requirement of some showing of
confusion, fraud or deception”).
48. 369 N.E.2d at 1164. Note the resemblance to Schechter’s dispersion
language. See supra text accompanying note 29.
49. Compare 369 N.E.2d at 1165 (noting that the legislature sought to
protect businesses from the “cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or
services which feeds upon the business reputation of an established distinctive
trademark”) with Schechter, supra note 26, at 823 (arguing that “this rule
that a trademark must be appurtenant to a going concern should not in any
way set limits to the extent of protection of such a mark when so
appurtenant”). See also Pearson, supra note 40, at 982 (positing that
“[t]rademark law . . . protects the trademark owner’s property rights . . .
[which are] derive[d] from the trademark’s ability to further the owner’s
business . . . “).
50. See Allied Maint., at 1165. The court reasoned that:
Since an action for infringement as well as an action for unfair
competition both require a showing that the public is likely to confuse
the defendant’s product or service with that of the plaintiff, relief may
be difficult to secure in situations in which the parties are not in
competition, nor produce similar products or perform similar services.
It is for this reason that [N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 368-d (1968)]
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Maintenance court’s definition of dilution has been adopted, by
both state and federal courts although the misconception that
parties must show a likelihood of confusion “curiously and
repetitively persists . . . in the jurisdictions where the dawn of
anti-dilution enlightenment currently seems to shine
51
The Allied Maintenance court’s rationale for
brightest.”
52
preventing dilution of the mark’s intrinsic value was not
53
widely accepted until the FTDA incorporated a similar
54
rationale. In fact, by the time the FTDA was enacted, only
about half of the states had any form of protection against
55
dilution.
B. THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
1. First, the Act.
Not until 1996, when the FTDA was enacted, did a federal

specifically provides that an injunction may be
notwithstanding the absence of competition or confusion.

obtained

Id.
51. GINSBURG, supra note 44, at 690. Note here that the Mattel court did
not fall into this trap. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903. Instead, the Mattel court
carefully contrasted trademark infringement from trademark dilution, and
observed that with dilution “the injury . . . usually occurs when consumers
aren’t confused about the source of a product.” Id.
52. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
53. See GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[1]. Gilson notes that:
Two facets of the FTDA explain why courts have been unenthusiastic
about dilution law. First, the public policy underlying the Dilution Act
stands in sharp contrast to that underlying the law of trademark
infringement. Under the latter, the twin policy reasons behind the
law are to protect the goodwill property rights of the trademark
owner and the corresponding right of the public to be free from
confusion, deception and mistake. The Dilution Act, on the other
hand, protects only a private interest, and a narrow one at that: the
distinctiveness of the owner’s famous trademark. At least in cases
where there is no simultaneous likelihood of confusion, there is no
identifiable benefit to the public. Second, taken to its extreme, the
FTDA suggests that federal law now requires or condones trademark
protection in gross, a concept that is completely alien to a century of
trademark jurisprudence.
Id. In response to the first argument, see infra text accompanying notes 76,
77. In response to the second argument, see infra text accompanying notes 6163.
54. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1030 (relying on a California court’s observation that “dilution is an
infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising
value of the mark”).
55. See id. (noting that “only approximately 25 states have laws that
prohibit trademark dilution”).
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cause of action exist to protect mark holders from a Schechtertype concept of dilution based on a mark’s protectable
56
uniqueness.
Under the Act, unlike state anti-dilution
measures, a nationwide injunction could now be issued with
57
uniformity and consistency. The FTDA has been described as
a “landmark upgrade of a legal concept that has been around
for decades and that, with some exceptions, has been largely
58
ineffectual.”
The FTDA defines dilution as, “the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1)
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other
59
parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”
It is important to note again that, in contrast to trademark
infringement, dilution can arise even where there is no
60
likelihood of confusion.
Dilution actions require that the
61
and sufficiently
injured mark be sufficiently famous
62
63
distinctive. Thus, the FTDA has limited applicability.
The FTDA provides a cause of action for a “commercial use
in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after
the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
64
distinctive quality of the mark.” Typically, the Act allows only

56. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). The FTDA uses the phrase
“distinctive quality” to incorporate the concept of uniqueness. Id. (stating that
“[t]he owner of a famous mark shall be entitled . . . to an injunction against
another person’s [use of that mark] . . . if such use . . . causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark . . . “).
57. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1030.
58. GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[1].
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
60. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir.
2002).
61. See GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[4][a] (discussing “Supermarks”).
62. See generally, GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[4][c][i][A]-[B]. Gilson
explores in depth the requirement of distinctiveness beyond mere famousness.
Id. § 5A.01[4][c][i][A]. Gilson concludes, based on explicit legislative history,
that marks with acquired distinctiveness are subject to protection under the
FTDA. Id. § 5A.01[4][c][i][B] (remarking that “the House Report states that
Section 43(c)(1)(A) ‘makes it clear that a mark may be deemed famous even if
not inherently distinctive’”) (some internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added).
63. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1999).
The court noted that the “distinctiveness” of the mark is an “important
limitation” because two thresholds limit the scope of a dilution injunction:
distinctiveness and fame. Id. Thus, the potential for abuse of dilution
injunction is lowered.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). Note here that the degree to which a
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injunctive relief for plaintiffs who own famous marks.
If,
however, the defendant “willfully intended to trade on the
owner’s reputation or to cause dilution of a famous mark” the
66
plaintiff may recover damages. This is, in part, recognition of
the theory that trademark rights are analogous to private
property rights in that efficient use of that property depends on
67
If First Amendment rights are allowed to
parcelization.
overcome dilution theory through First Amendment protection
of commercial speech, then Congress would be faced with the
notion that trademarks are communal property used for
commercial purposes by anyone interested in participating in
the economic process. This leads to a less efficient use of
resources and clearly cannot be in the best interests of the
68
public good. Although Congress did not explicitly adopt this
line of reasoning, it is clear from the legislative history that
Congress was attempting to protect trademark rights of
individual entities, and that it believed that trademarks were
69
not communal property.

plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant caused dilution by a showing
of actual harm or an inference of likely harm was the subject of significant
controversy among the circuits. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. 123
S.Ct. 1115, 1120-22 (2003) (citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. Of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), for the
actual harm standard and Nabisco, 191 F.3d 208, for the competing inference
of likely harm standard). However, a unanimous court resolved this question
and found that the FTDA plainly required a showing of “actual dilution.” Id.
at 1124. The Court qualified its holding by noting that the FTDA did not
require plaintiffs to show “an actual loss of sales or profits.” Id
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2000).
66. Id. Note here that damages are defined as “recover[y of] (1)
defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the
costs of the action.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000). Furthermore, the “court may
order that [the dilutitive material] shall be delivered up and destroyed.” 15
U.S.C. § 1118 (2000).
67. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND
THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS, 126-35, 156-73 (2001). Komesar offers
an explanation of the reasons why property rights are more efficient when
parceled out and attempts to explain the problems that result as the number
of participants and the complexity of systems increases. Id. at 127-33.
Komesar presents tough institutional choices faced by courts and legislatures
and argues that as numbers increase, there will be a shift “from informal to
formal mechanisms of enforcement and a shift within formal mechanisms
from common law courts to political process regulation.” Id. at 133. Komesar
notes that this produces an increased likelihood of complicated balancing tests
that attempt to accommodate flexible and uncertain inquiry. See id. at 158.
68. See id. at 128-33.
69. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1031 (characterizing the United States as “a leader setting the
standards for strong worldwide protection of intellectual property”-a position
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The FTDA provides four affirmative defenses: (1)
70
ownership by the defendant of a valid federal registration; (2)
fair use of another’s mark in a comparative advertisement to
71
identify competing goods or services; (3) noncommercial use of
72
another’s mark; and (4) use of another’s mark in news
73
reporting and news commentary. As explained later in this
comment, the Mattel court’s decision (and the focus of this
comment) was based on its analysis of the scope of the
74
noncommercial use exception in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B).
Although the FTDA’s scope is limited, some circuits and
scholars are hostile to the Act’s protection for dilution because
75
they do not see any benefit to the consumer public. Others,
however, argue that protection from dilution is needed because
the consumer public is harmed when they cannot identify
76
brands with specific products or services. For instance, part of
the purchase price of branded goods and services includes the
goodwill value of the mark. If a trademark is diluted and its

it could not adopt if Congress did not believe that trademark rights were not
important personal property-like rights).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2000).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(C).
74. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. denied 2003 WL 167680 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2003) (arguing that
“[w]hereas trademark law targets ‘interference with the source signaling
function’ of trademarks, dilution protects owners ‘from an appropriation of or
free riding on’ the substantial investment that they have made in their marks”
(quoting I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (1st Cir. 1998))).
75. See GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[4][c][i][B] (noting that “the
ambiguity found by the Second Circuit in such straightforward statutory
language reflects the court’s hostility to the [FTDA’s] broad protections”); see
also GINSBURG, supra note 44, at 693-96 (presenting excerpts of Milton W.
Hollander, Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatable with the National
Protection of Trademark?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 273-74, 276-81, 285-87
(1985)).
76. See generally Kimberly L. Muller, A Position of Advocacy in Support of
Adoption of a Preemptive Federal Antidilution Statute, 83 TRADEMARK REP.
175 (1993). Muller notes in particular three principal rationales (among
others) for protecting trademarks owners from dilution:
(1) Trademarks are valuable tools which enable consumers to repetitively
purchase goods of consistent qualities; (2) [i]nvestment in valuable trademark
assets by mark holders is vital to encourage a healthy and robust economy;
[and] (3) [t]he law recognizes that the trademark property of one party should
not be freely taken by another party without permission.
Id. at 175. But see generally Paul C. Van Slyke, State Laws Against
Trademark Dilution: Why They Should Not Be Preempted By the Lanham Act,
83 TRADEMARK REP. 197 (1993).
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goodwill diminished, then it is possible that the consumer
would not have paid the original purchase price—instead the
purchaser would have paid a lower price commensurate with
77
the good’s lack of attached brand distinction. In a sense, this
is an issue of consumer protection. There is no doubt that the
mark holder will receive the major benefit of FTDA protection,
but ultimately, protecting the mark from dilution fosters
investment in the development of such marks and this
increases their total value to society. But what exactly is
dilution and how does it protect trademarks?
2. Then, Dilution explained.
Dilution under the FTDA can occur through blurring or
78
tarnishment. Blurring occurs when a junior user relies on the
senior user’s mark to identify the junior user’s goods or
services, thus “raising the possibility that the mark will lose its
ability to serve as a unique identifier of the [senior user’s]
79
Currently, blurring analysis under the FTDA is
products.”
80
best illustrated by the Nabisco test. The Nabisco court upheld
a dilution injunction because “Pepperidge Farm is likely to
succeed in establishing that Nabisco’s use of its goldfish shape

77. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 862 (arguing that “[d]ilution protection
thus encourages companies to invest more than they otherwise might in the
creation of intangible associations”).
78. See GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[6] at n.220 (quoting Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Baily Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 452 (4th Cir. 1999) (“finding that the FTDA’s legislative history
‘indicates that Congress understood that dilution might result either from
uses that blur the distinctiveness of [a famous] mark or [that] tarnish or
disparage it”)); see also, Pearson, supra note 40, at 986-90 (explaining the
historical and practical application of the theories behind blurring (as a loss of
distinctiveness) and tarnishment (as a species of loss of business reputation)).
79. GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[5][a].
80. Id., § 5A.01[5][d]. The Nabisco factors used to determine likelihood of
dilution are: (1) “the distinctiveness of the senior mark;” (2) “the similarity of
the marks;” (3) “the proximity of the products and the likelihood of bridging
the gap;” (4) “the interrelationship among the distinctiveness of the senior
mark, the similarity of the junior mark, and the proximity of the products;” (5)
“shared consumers and geographical limitations;” (6) “sophistication of
consumers;” (7) “actual confusion;” (8) “adjectival or referential quality of the
junior use;” (9) “harm to the junior user and delay by the senior user;” and (10)
“effect of the senior user’s prior laxity in protecting the mark.” Nabisco, Inc. v.
PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217-22 (2d Cir. 1999). The Nabiso Court noted
that its list of factors was non-exclusive and should be refined over time. Id.
at 227-28. However, Gilson notes that some of these factors have been
criticized as being largely relevant to a likelihood of confusion analysis, for
instance, the third factor, proximity of the products. GILSON, supra note 14, §
5A.01[5][d][xi].
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in an orange, cheddar-cheese-flavored, bite-sized cracker
dilutes the distinctive quality of Pepperidge Farm’s previously
famous mark, consisting of a goldfish-shaped orange, cheddar81
Nabisco is particularly
cheese-flavored, bite-sized cracker.”
interesting because it demonstrates how powerful the FTDA
can be: Pepperidge Farm prevailed solely on an FTDA dilution
82
claim and halted Nabisco’s entry into Pepperidge Farm’s
coveted goldfish cracker market, estimated to be worth more
83
than $200 million.
Tarnishment traditionally occurs when a mark is
associated with a “shoddy or poor quality product” or
84
Under the
“portrayed in an unflattering or unsavory way.”
FTDA, tarnishment is explicitly included as a distinct injury
85
The boundaries of
not requiring likelihood of confusion.
tarnishment actions have not yet been defined under the
FTDA, but generally where the mark is “associated with
obscenity, sexual activity or criminal activity, a court is far
86
more likely to find that [the mark] has been tarnished.”
87
However, “tarnishment is not limited to seamy conduct.”

81. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217.
82. Id. at 213 (noting that “[t]he district court found for Pepperidge and
granted the preliminary injunction on the federal and state dilution claims,
but not on the federal trademark infringement or state unfair competition
claims”) (emphasis added).
83. Id. Interestingly, Pepperidge Farms apparently spent (between 1995
and 1998) $120 million marketing goldfish crackers in order to double net
sales of Goldfish crackers to $200 million in 1998. Id. at 212-13. This further
emphasizes a trademark’s intrinsic value as a marketing tool.
84. GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[6][a]; cf Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc., 123 S.Ct. 1115, 1125 (2003) (noting that “[tarnishing] is not a necessary
consequence of mental association”).
85. See GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[6][b].
86. Id. Gilson notes a statement from the Trademark Review Commission
that proposed what ultimately became the FTDA. Id. (stating “[i]n general,
those which tend to amuse or parody, and are not likely to confuse, are not
actionable. Those which are disgusting, vulgar and no laughing matter often
are”).
87. Id. at § 5A.01[6][b] (quoting Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson
Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996)); cf. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders,
Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.1979) (holding film
distributor liable for using Dallas Cowboys cheerleader uniform in
pornographic film; the record showed that the actress wearing the
trademarked uniform had never been a Dallas Cowboys cheerleader). Some
commentators have argued that Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders was wrongly
decided because the film’s expression was never found to be obscene under the
First Amendment. See Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay
Olympics Case, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 604, 621-26 (1989) (this article was
originally published under the same title in 69 B.U. L. REV. 131 (1989)).
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In, American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Productions,
88
Inc., the Minnesota District Court found tarnishment of
American Dairy Queen’s (ADQ) wholesome trademark by a film
“mockumentary” that New Line Productions planned to title
89
New Line’s film satirized a Mid-western
“Dairy Queens.”
90
beauty pageant in a potentially offensive light.
The court
granted a dilution injunction notwithstanding New Line’s
argument that an injunction would infringe on its expressive
91
First Amendment right to choose whatever title it wanted.
The court was swayed by ADQ’s argument that it did not seek
to alter any of the film’s dialogue or expressive content; instead,
ADQ “simply want[ed] to keep the public from developing the
92
sense that it [was] a sponsor or endorser of New Line’s film.”
As is evident from the above discussion, the FTDA
implicates First Amendment concerns. The expressive content
of the junior user’s use raised First Amendment concerns in
Am. Dairy Queen, but not in Nabisco. Is there a difference? If
so, where does the FTDA intersect the First Amendment?
3. Diluting Dilution: One Part Blurring and One Part
Tarnishment.
It appears that dilution actions resting on tarnishment
claims potentially implicate the First Amendment more
93
As one court noted, “[u]se of
directly than blurring claims.

According to those commentators, the film distributor should have won
because “mere tarnishment arising from free trade in ideas outside the realm
of commercial advertising should be considered an unrecognizable harm.” Id.
at 624 n.94.
88. 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998).
89. Id. at 728, 733.
90. See id. at 728-29 (remarking that “the movie portrays [local beauty]
contests as filled with backbiting and jealousy, and suggests the participants
tend to suffer from eating disorders . . . and contain[s] off-color humor . . .
which may offend many . . . viewers”).
91. See id. at 733.
92. Id.
Indeed, the court contended that ADQ’s argument was
strengthened by New Line’s denial that “its use of the ‘Dairy Queens’ name
[was] designed to evoke or even suggest any relationship at all to ADQ[.]” Id.
at 734. The court noted that if New Line has chosen the title specifically to
comment on ADQ, then its First Amendment argument might have carried
more weight because no alternative avenues of expression would exist. Id. at
734-35.
93. Cf. GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[5][a]. Gilson implies that dilutitive
blurring in ordinary business competition does not raise First Amendment
concerns because blurring is confined to “when the defendant uses or modifies
the plaintiff’s famous trademark to identify the defendant’s goods or services.”
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another’s trademark is entitled to First Amendment protection
only when the use of that mark is part of a communicative
message, not when it is used merely to identify the source of a
94
Thus, when courts construe the intersection
product.”
between FTDA rights and the First Amendment, careful
consideration of the type and context of the alleged dilution is
95
particularly important.
Blurring claims generally involve business competition
motives. The junior user is, in a sense, trading on the goodwill
of the senior user’s mark to sell its goods. For example,
Nabisco was clearly attempting to trade on the distinctiveness

Id. (emphasis added). Thus the “harm is to the famous mark” and not
Id. § 5A.01[5][b].
consumers.
In contrast, Gilson observes “[p]ast
[tarnishment] decisions preventing the use of a mark in puns, satire and
parody have raised genuine issues of free speech.” Id. § 5A.01[6][b] (emphasis
added). Gilson concludes that the FTDA’s noncommercial use exemption
specifically relieves this tension. Id.
94. OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 197-98
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (emphasis added). In OBH, a newspaper (The Buffalo News)
sought a dilution injunction against a website operator using the domain
name “www.thebuffalonews.com” to lead consumers to a website disparaging
the newspaper. Id. at 181-183. The court, using the Second Circuit’s Nabisco
factors, determined that the plaintiff was injured by a blurring effect, where
the consumer is momentarily led to associate the domain name (hence
plaintiff’s mark) with the defendant’s own website. See id. at 193-96. This
“initial interest confusion” is dilutitive, even though there was no actual
confusion, and notwithstanding the explicit disclaimer posted on the
defendant’s website. See id. at 195. The court analyzed the plaintiff’s injury
in a “particularistic, context sensitive” manner and held that the defendant’s
First Amendment defense was without merit because the plaintiffs “[did] not
seek . . . to restrain defendants from speech that criticizes The Buffalo News.”
Id. at 197.
95. See e.g., id. The court found that the blurring injury was strong and
the remedy limited in a manner sufficient to outweigh any First Amendment
rights of the defendant to name his website using the plaintiff’s mark.
Similarly, in Am. Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 733-35, the defendant’s
crucial assertion that the title itself did not contain any expressive content
referring to ADQ allowed the court to enjoin the defendant’s tarnishing use of
Am. Dairy Queen is particularly interesting because a
ADQ’s mark.
tarnishment injury implicates stronger First Amendment rights—generally
tarnishment includes some expression about the mark, whereas blurring is
simply use of the mark. The court noted that if there had been expressive
content in the title, the injury suffered by ADQ might not have outweighed
New Line’s First Amendment interests. Thus, even though the alleged injury
was tarnishment, the Am. Dairy Queen court correctly found that the
plaintiff’s mark was impermissibly diluted given the contextual use of ADQ’s
mark. Cf. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161,
1167 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding that defendant’s use of “ballysucks” as part of
his domain name was protected by First Amendment in trademark action
brought by “Bally” trademark holder).
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of Pepperidge Farm’s trademarked “[goldfish-shaped] orange,
96
97
cheddar-cheese-flavored, bite-sized cracker” in Nabisco. By
comparison, the Am. Dairy Queen court, examining a
tarnishment injury, could not conclusively state that New Line
was attempting to trade on ADQ’s goodwill because New Line
98
offered to append disclaimers to its marketing materials.
Instead, the court examined ADQ’s tarnishment claim and
99
weighed it against New Line’s First Amendment rights.
Although ADQ prevailed, the court considered it a crucial
distinction that New Line argued: “the [f]ilm’s title is not
100
intended to in any way suggest [or] refer to” ADQ’s image.
101
New Line’s complete lack of expressive intent was fatal.
If
New Line had alleged some artistic relevance to its title choice,
it is likely that the Am. Dairy Queen court would have found in
102
favor of New Line.
These cases suggest that dilution depends on the relative
interests and rights of the junior and senior user. A junior user
trading on a senior mark’s goodwill for its competitive business
interests infringes on the senior user’s FTDA rights. The use
by the junior user is generally limited to commercial speech—in
other words, “expression related solely to the economic
103
interests of the speaker.” In contrast, a junior user relying on
the senior mark’s goodwill to comment on that mark (through
parody, satire, association with seamy conduct, or portrayal in
an unflattering manner), implicates non-commercial First
104
Thus, any FTDA rights can potentially
Amendment rights.
be outweighed by the public’s interest in expressive freedom
depending on whether the tarnishment is expressive or non
96. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217.
97. Id. at 218 (contending that “[n]ot withstanding slight differences in
shape, size and marking . . . [the differences] would not be easily noticed,
except on a close inspection of a sort that is not likely to be performed by one
who is intent on popping the crackers into his mouth”).
98. See Am. Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 732.
99. See id. at 732-35.
100. Id. at 734 (quoting Mem. in Opp’n to Pl’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 5).
101. See id. at 734-35 (stating that “[t]he idea expressed is not a reference
to [ADQ’s] mark. Absent such relevance, the Court concludes that alternative
avenues for expressing the idea exist”).
102. See id.
103. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980) (defining commercial speech).
104. Cf. GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[6][b] (observing that “past
decisions preventing the use of a mark in puns, satire and parody have raised
genuine issues of free speech”).
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expressive. This is a distinctly different view from the Mattel
court’s view that any expressive content absolutely precludes
106
an FTDA injunction.
What makes the distinction between non-expressive
tarnishment and expressive tarnishment important is that the
non-expressive use can occur within the context of protected
First Amendment speech. The Fifth Circuit, in Westchester
107
Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., found that the title of the
magazine was “expressive to an appreciable degree . . .
[requiring] more protection than the labeling of ordinary
108
The Westchester Media court
commercial products.”
determined that the senior user had not shown proof of actual
109
dilution and found that there was no legitimate FTDA claim,
but nevertheless the court clearly recognized that the
magazine’s non-expressive use was limited notwithstanding the
magazine’s otherwise unfettered expressive use right to use the
110
mark. The court suggested that the appropriate remedy may
be “not less speech, but more” and ordered consideration of
111
disclaimer relief.
The court noted that the disclaimer relief
was particularly effective in this case because the “markets for
both PRL’s products and Westchester’s magazine consist of
112
Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s
relatively sophisticated buyers.”
complete analysis resulted in adequate recognition of PRL’s
mark while at the same time protecting Westchester Media’s
First Amendment rights.
Before analyzing the Mattel court’s opinion in light of the
distinction between blurring and tarnishment, the First
Amendment must be addressed. What is the current status of
the commercial speech doctrine? Does commercial speech

105. Cf. Am. Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 734 (explaining that “the
argument that there is no other way to express the idea of the film’s title
carries much less weight”).
106. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906-07 (9th Cir.
2002); cf. infra note 199 and accompanying text.
107. 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000) (designer Ralph Lauren and owner of
“Polo” trademark sued publisher of magazine titled “Polo”).
108. Id. at 672.
109. See id. at 671. The “proof of actual dilution” issue has since been
resolved. See supra note 64 and discussion relating to Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. 123 S.Ct. 1115, (2003).
110. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 673-74 (requiring disclaimer relief
to be considered). The Fifth Circuit noted that PRL claimed dilution by
blurring and tarnishment. Id. at 670 n.12.
111. Id. at 675 (supporting its suggestion for disclaimer relief).
112. Id. at 674.
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deserve different treatment than non-commercial expression?
4. Now, the First Amendment.
113

114

Life began for the commercial speech doctrine in 1942
when the United States Supreme Court ruled that commercial
115
speech fell outside the scope of First Amendment protection.
In 1976, the Supreme Court reversed Chrestensen in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
116
Virginia Pharmacy spawned the modern
Council, Inc.

113. Just like the early days of Schecter’s dilution theory, the emerging
importance of advertising appears at the genesis of the commercial speech
doctrine. Compare Klieger supra note 24, at 807 with infra note 115 and
accompanying text.
114. See DENISE M. TRAUTH & JOHN L. HUFFMAN, The Commercial Speech
Doctrine: Posadas Revisionism, in ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 99,
99 (Honorable Theodore R. Kupferman, ed., 1990).
115. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The Chrestensen
Court dealt with § 318 of the New York Sanitary Code, “which forbids
distribution of commercial and business advertising matter,” but does not
forbid distribution of material devoted solely to “information or a public
protest.” Id. at 53. Chrestensen distributed a double-sided handbill: one side
was devoted solely to commercial advertising, while the other was devoted to
“protest against the action of the City Dock Department . . . but no commercial
advertising.” Id. In a remarkably short opinion, the Supreme Court ruled
that the city ordinance did not violate the Constitution and apparently left no
room for argument:
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places
for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and
disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities
may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they
may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public
thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no
such restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising.
Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
However, the commercial speech doctrine was comprehensively re-examined
in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The issue faced by the Bigelow
Court was a newspaper’s right to carry paid advertising that encouraged or
prompted procuring an abortion. Id. at 809. The defendant was convicted of
violating a Virginia statute that read: “If any person, by publication, lecture,
advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, . . . or in any
other manner, encourage or promote the processing of abortion or
miscarriage, . . . he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” Id. at 813 n.3 (citing
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1972)). The Supreme Court established that “speech
is not stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it appears in
[the form of a paid commercial advertisement].” Id. at 818. Bigelow was
particularly important because, in addition to granting constitutional
protection for some forms of commercial speech, it established that protection
was justified because the public had a need for the information contained in
the advertisement. TRAUTH & HUFFMAN, supra note 114, at 100.
116. See 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Virginia statute at issue, section 54-
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commercial speech doctrine and essentially stands for the
proposition that “speech which does ‘no more than propose a
commercial transaction’” is entitled to some First Amendment
118
However, the Court’s application of Virginia
protection.
119
Pharmacy has been inconsistent and the doctrine has been
labeled “a notoriously unstable and contentious domain of First
120
Amendment jurisprudence.”

524.35 Va. Code Ann. (1974), stated that “a pharmacist licensed in Virginia is
guilty of unprofessional conduct if he ‘(3) publishes, advertises or promotes, . . .
any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms . . . for any
drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription.’” Id. at 749-50. The
Virginia Pharmacy Court held that “speech which does ‘no more than propose
a commercial transaction’” may be of general public interest. Id. at 762, 764.
The court noted that the “particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of
commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.” Id. at 763. As a result, “the
free flow of commercial information is indispensable” to a free enterprise
economy because that information is used to make intelligent, well-informed
decisions. Id. at 765. This reasoning parallels the traditional concept of First
Amendment protection for expression: participants in a democratic selfgoverning political process must have guaranteed freedom of public discussion
in order to make well-informed political decisions. Alexander Meiklejohn,
POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26-28
(1960).
117. See Post, supra note 21, at 2 (citing Virginia Pharmacy).
118. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (remarking that commercial
speech does not lack all First Amendment protection); see generally TRAUTH &
HUFFMAN, supra note 114, at 101-03.
119. See David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial
Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359, 383 (1990) (arguing that the court has treated
very loosely the language defining commercial speech and contrasting Virginia
Pharmacy with Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980)).
120. Post, supra note 21, at 2. One reason for this inconsistency might be
that the lack of full First Amendment protection is based on “‘commonsense’
differences between commercial speech and other varieties.” Bates v. State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977).
These common sense differences,
“unarticulated almost by definition, subsequently have supported a great
many restrictions of commercial speech”. McGowan, supra note 119, at 369
(quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 380-81). The Bates Court relied on Virginia
Pharmacy to find that commercial speech, although protected, was not given
absolute protection. McGowan, supra note 119, at 369; cf. TRAUTH &
HUFFMAN, supra note 114, at 104 (observing that “when advertising fulfills
the informational needs of consumers it serves an ‘indispensable’ role” and
thus implying the existence of circumstances where advertising does not fulfill
the informational needs of consumers).
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978), the court articulated a
First Amendment value hierarchy explaining that commercial speech was less
deserving of protection than non-commercial speech. Ohralik, a lawyer, was
described as an “ambulance chase[r].” Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring).
The Court upheld Ohio’s regulation against in-person solicitation by lawyers
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The inconsistent Supreme Court decisions prompted an
extensive re-examination of the commercial speech doctrine in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
122
Commission.
The Court re-examined the First Amendment

by adopting a “leveling rationale.” McGowan, supra note 119, at 370. The
Court reaoned as follows:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and
noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling
process, of the force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the
latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the First Amendment to
such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a
limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate
position in the scale of First Amendment value. . . .
Ohralik at 456. This theory has garnered sympathy from other commentators.
McGowan, supra note 119, at 370 n.67 (citing Frederick Schauer, Commercial
Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181,
1182 n.8 (1988)). McGowan contends that the leveling rationale was used to
“justify extending a lesser degree of first amendment protection for
commercial speech than the court gave speech it believed was at the core of
the first amendment.” McGowan, supra note 119, at 370. McGowan
concludes: “the Court’s indiscriminate use of the leveling rationale allowed it
to avoid the more difficult problem of justifying its treatment of commercial
speech by reference to first amendment theory.” Id. at 371.
121. See e.g., McGowan, supra note 119, at 371. McGowan correctly
contends that the Ohralik Court “failed to incorporate into its analysis the
distinction between speech and conduct that entails speech.” Id. This is based
on McGowan’s analysis of the economic due process argument. See id., at 439441 (critiquing Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979)). Essentially, the
hypothesis is that commercial speech is not speech for First Amendment
purposes; rather it is merely another form of economic activity. Id. This
argument works “only if advertisements constituting verbal acts are conflated
with the balance of commercial speech.” Id. at 440. But a court, striking down
economic regulations with which it disagrees, would be “using the first
amendment as a pretext for implementing its economic policies.” Id.
McGowan properly concludes that the economic due process argument fails
because it would be valid only for “advertisements that actually constitute
offers—using language that in and of itself creates a commercial obligation.”
Id. at 440-41. Thus, that the Ohralik Court’s failure to distinguish between
speech and conduct that entails speech allowed it to “avoid the more difficult
problem of justifying its treatment of commercial speech by reference to first
amendment theory.” Id. at 371.
122. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
In Central Hudson, the Public Service
Commission of New York responded to a fuel shortage with a ban of all
advertising that promoted electricity use. Id. at 558-59. After the shortage
was over the Commission extended the ban, reasoning that “all promotional
advertising [was] contrary to the national policy of conserving energy.” Id. at
559. However, the Commission’s order explicitly permitted “informational”
advertising designed to encourage “‘shifts of consumption’ from peak demand
times to periods of low electricity demand.” Id. at 560. The trial court upheld
the Commission’s order, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, finding
that “the governmental interest in the prohibition outweighed the limited
constitutional value of the commercial speech at issue.” Id. at 560-61. The
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basis for protecting commercial speech and concluded that
protection must “turn[] on the nature both of the expression
123
and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.”
The Court further stated that, in certain circumstances, the
124
In
government may proscribe some forms of communication.
doing so, the Court articulated a four-part test to determine
whether commercial speech is protected by the First
125
Finally, the Court defined commercial speech
Amendment.
as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the
126
speaker” and alternately characterized commercial speech as
127
that which “propose[s] a commercial transaction.”
Thus, the
Supreme Court had finally provided a workable method for
determining what commercial speech was and how to tell

Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and struck down the provision as
overbroad in relation to the asserted state interests. Id. at 570-72.
123. Id. at 563.
124. The Central Hudson Court outlined its reasoning:
The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the
informational function of advertising. Consequently, there can be no
constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages
that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The
government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive
the public than to inform it or commercial speech related to illegal
activity.
Id. at 563-64 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
125. Id. at 566. The test was stated follows:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest
is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.
Id. McGowan explains that this test was significant because “the test [implied
an admission by the Court] that states could regulate even some truthful
commercial speech.” McGowan, supra note 119, at 372. Also, note here that
the Central Hudson test remains valid today. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367-68 (2002) (stating “[a]lthough several Members of
the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and
whether it should apply in particular cases . . . there is no need in this case to
break new ground”) (internal citations omitted).
126. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561 (stating “[t]he Commission’s order
restricts only commercial speech, that is, expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience”).
127. Id. at 561-62 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56); Contra McGowan,
supra note 119, at 371. McGowan contends that the Central Hudson Court
“failed to define what it meant by commercial speech, referring to such speech
alternatively as” expression of the speaker’s economic interests and speech
proposing a commercial transaction. Id.
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128

Central Hudson stands as
whether it was protected or not.
the authoritative commercial speech case and the Court’s
pronouncement that “the First Amendment’s concern for
commercial speech is based on the informational function of
129
advertising” is still cited as settled law.
Unfortunately, commentators have long argued that the
130
Central Hudson commercial speech doctrine is incoherent.
This argument has been renewed by recent opinions handed
131
132
In 1996
a
down within ten years of each other.
“fragmented” and highly “libertarian” Supreme Court in 44
133
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island debated the continuation of
Central Hudson’s validity and struck down a state prohibition
134
against advertising the retail price of alcoholic beverages.
The Court based its decision on a “strong skepticism toward
state regulation of advertising as a device for preventing
consumers from knowing about a product in order to induce
them not to buy it – the very rationale that had easily
sustained the regulation in [Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v.
135
Tourism Co.]” ten years earlier. However, the 44 Liquormart
decision was arguably inconsistent with past commercial
136
In fact, “before the [1996] Term, advocates and
speech cases.

128. See TRAUTH & HUFFMAN, supra note 114, at 107.
129. Post, supra note 21, at 14 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563);
see e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 426 (2001).
130. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 119, at 360.
131. See Post, supra note 21 at 3. Post argues that the Court’s opinion in
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), “was so
solicitous of government restrictions as to suggest . . . that commercial speech
doctrine was ‘left for dead.’” Id. at 3. Post contrasts Posadas with the Court’s
opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). Post
contends that the 44 Liquormart opinion was “so protective [of all speech] as
to render it unclear why commercial speech should continue to be treated as a
separate category of speech.” Id. at 3 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Sullivan, supra note 8).
132. Note here that the FTDA was passed in both houses by December
1995, before the 44 Liquormart decision was handed down on May 13, 1996.
Compare H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 1 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029 with 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484.
133. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 484.
134. See id.
135. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 126. Sullivan noted that “[the Supreme
Court] likewise found the state’s goal (less bibulous Rhode Islanders)
inadequately met by means that should have seemed sensible, not silly, by the
lights of previous decisions.” Id. Sullivan concluded that “[44] Liquormart is
thus the Court’s most libertarian decision on commercial speech since Virginia
[Pharmacy].” Id.
136. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 140 (contending that “by the logic of
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opponents of robust protection for commercial speech each
137
could claim some measure of victory.”
The most important
aspect of 44 Liquormart was the Court’s argument about the
appropriate standard of scrutiny commercial speech deserved –
138
It is quite clear from
if it deserved its own standard at all.
the divergent opinions that the Court had no clear explanation
why commercial speech should or should not “continue to be
treated as a separate category of speech isolated from general
139
First Amendment principles.”
A doctrinal middle position between these two extremes
exists: the Supreme Court in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
140
141
Corp. found that 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2) violated the First
Amendment rights of the advertiser and manufacturer of
142
Trojan brand condoms. The Bolger Court explained that, “the
First Amendment means that [the] government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
143
The Court qualified this
subject matter, or its content.”
sweeping statement by observing that “[b]y contrast, regulation
of commercial speech based on content is less problematic”

Central Hudson, Posadas, and [United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509
U.S. 418 (1993)], 44 Liquormart should have been an easy case the other
way”).
137. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 125. In part, the Court’s reversal of Posadas
and re-alignment with Virginia Pharmacy has been attributed to the 1994
retirement of Justice Blackmun. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 146 & n.84.
138. See generally Sullivan, supra note 8, Section III. Sullivan argues that
it is “unclear whether [Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Thomas and Ginsburg]
would apply strict scrutiny to all laws aimed at the content of a commercial
advertisement, or only to those that are paternalistic.” Id. at 146. Yet even
Justices Stevens, Kennedy and Ginsburg would “withhold strict scrutiny
‘when a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from
misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices’ . . . – in which case they
would apply ‘less than strict review’ even though such regulations would
ordinarily be considered content-based.” Id. (citing 44 Liquormart). Sullivan
observes that “this little-noticed dictum” departed from conventional
commercial speech doctrine in that it advocated “less than strict review” for
fraudulent or misleading commercial speech. Id. Sullivan astutely contends
that under these circumstances, “[a]ny review, even if ‘less than strict review,’
is thus a novelty.” Id. In sum, the court’s position on the protection afforded
to commercial speech was agressively expansive compared to the Posadas
Court. See supra note 131.
139. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 126.
140. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
141. Id. at 61 (“[p]rohibit[ing] the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for
contraceptives”).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 65 (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
(1972)).
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because of the problems of deception, confusion, and potential
144
consumer fraud.
Although the court eventually found that
the speech at stake was protected commercial speech, it is
hardly surprising given that the advertising related to
145
The Bolger Court seemed to have made a
contraception.
decision that the non-commercial value of the speech
substantially outweighed any commercial value. Yet because
that non-commercial speech was clearly related to standard
commercial speech, it characterized the whole as a type of
146
protected commercial speech.

144. 463 U.S. at 65 (emphasis added). The Bolger Court then analyzed the
speech to determine whether it was commercial or non-commercial, stating
that the degree of protection rests on correct classification as such. Id. The
Court noted that most of Bolger’s mailings fell within the “core notion of
commercial speech – speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial
transaction.’” Id. at 66 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762). The
Bolger Court stated that:
The mailings constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the fact
that they contain discussions of important public issues such as
venereal disease and family planning. We have made clear that
advertising which “links a product to current public debate” is not
thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded to
noncommercial speech. . . . We conclude, therefore, that all of the
mailings in this case are entitled to the qualified but nonetheless
substantial protection accorded to commercial speech.
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67-68 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
What is interesting about this opinion is that the Court, in its discussion of
whether to protect the speech, notes that advertising for contraceptives
“implicates ‘substantial individual and societal interests’” in the free flow of
commercial information [and] also relates to activity which is protected from
unwarranted state interference. Id. at 69 (emphasis added) (citing Carey v.
Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-701 (1977)). Essentially the Bolger
Court is protecting this commercial speech because its content strongly relates
to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69.
This content-specific analysis assumes that the public needs protection from
misleading speech because it “lacks sophistication.” See Post, supra note 21,
at 40. Post’s compelling insight here is that “Central Hudson’s use of the
misleading requirement as a threshold precondition for First Amendment
protection cannot, without internal contradiction, be premised upon the
content of speech.” Id. at 41 (emphasis added). Post suggests that “[t]he
contradiction can be resolved only by . . . focus[ing] on the specific conditions
that might be understood to render consumers dependent and vulnerable.” Id.
145. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
146. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68 (noting that the type of speech at issue is
“entitled to the qualified but nonetheless substantial protection accorded to
commercial speech”). Justice Stevens, concurring with the Bolger Court,
disagreed on the grounds that the distinction between non-commercial and
commercial speech involved compromise. Cf. id. at 82-83. Justice Stevens
wrote that instead, “it may be more fruitful to focus on the nature of the
challenged regulation rather than the proper label for the communication. Id.
at 82-83 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens focused on the purpose behind the
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Most recently, the Court in Thompson v. Western States
147
Medical Center
reaffirmed that commercial speech enjoys a
148
“qualified but nonetheless substantial protection.”
The
Thompson Court emphasized that “even a communication that
does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled
149
but qualified this
to coverage of the First Amendment,”
assertion by reaffirming the Virginia Pharmacy Court’s holding
that “not all regulation of [commercial] speech is
150
The Thompson Court agreed that some
unconstitutional.”
types of commercial speech may still be regulated if it concerns
151
This seemed to affirm a
unlawful or misleading activity.
middle position between Posadas and 44 Liquormart, a position
that nevertheless offers some types of commercial speech less
than full First Amendment protection. Furthermore, this
position seems to be consistent with the 44 Liquormart Court’s
general lack of comfort in fully protecting misleading speech or
speech that the government has a strong interest in
152
Thompson is most important for its recognition
restricting.
that Central Hudson remains a valuable part of the
Commercial Speech doctrine, and that regulation of commercial
speech can be constitutional.
The amount of protection afforded to commercial speech
compared to noncommercial speech is unclear. However, it is
clear that commercial speech may be constitutionally

message, and argued that “[i]t matters whether a law regulates
communications for their ideas or for their style.” Id. at 84. Justice Stevens
concluded that “regulations of form and context may strike a constitutionally
appropriate balance between the advocate’s right to convey a message and the
recipient’s interest in the quality of his environment.” Id. at 84. This
statement was echoed by his position in 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484 (1996),
that “bars against ‘dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial
messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining
process’ should receive strict scrutiny” while “regulations whose purpose is ‘to
protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales
practices’ . . . should receive ‘less than strict’ scrutiny.” Sullivan, supra note 8,
at 142.
147. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
148. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905 n.7.
149. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,
767 (1993)).
150. Thompson, at 367. The Court found that the regulations at issue were
unconstitutional because, applying Central Hudson, the proposed restrictions
were overly broad. Id. at 376-77.
151. See id. at 367.
152. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (explaining the positions of
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg).
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regulated. The ability to impose such regulation may arguably
depend on the nature of the regulation, rather than just the
content of the speech.
II. THE MATTEL DECISION
The legal battle began on September 11, 1997, when
Mattel, Inc. filed suit against MCA Records, Inc. in a California
153
This case involved Mattel in its
Federal District Court.
capacity as owner of the Barbie trademark, and MCA in its
capacity as producer, marketer, and seller of Barbie Girl, a
154
What makes this case so
song by the Danish band “Aqua.”
immediately appealing is the fact that Barbie is more than a
155
blonde doll with a diverse wardrobe; she is a cultural icon.
In March 1997, Aqua released its album, Aquarium, in
156
Europe.
The eleven-song album included the song Barbie
Girl, in which band members assume the identity of Barbie and
157
In Barbie Girl, the band members sing
her boyfriend Ken.
about Barbie’s “[l]ife in plastic,” and state that Barbie is “a
158
Clearly, the song is
blonde bimbo girl, in a fantasy world.”

153. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1407 (C.D.Cal.
1998) (order denying preliminary injunction) (hereinafter Mattel Order).
154. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d. 894, 898-99 (2002).
155. See id. at 898. Judge Kozinski delved into the history of Barbie to
provide this memorable account:
Barbie was born in Germany in the 1950s as an adult collector’s item.
Over the years, Mattel transformed her from a doll that resembled a
“German street walker,” as she originally appeared, into a glamorous,
long-legged blonde. Barbie has been labeled both the ideal American
woman and a bimbo. She has survived attacks both psychic (from
feminists critical of her fictitious figure) and physical (more than 500
professional makeovers). She remains a symbol of American girlhood,
a public figure who graces the aisles of toy stores throughout the
country and beyond. With Barbie, Mattel created not just a toy but a
cultural icon.
Id. (citing M.G. LORD, FOREVER BARBIE: THE UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY OF A
REAL DOLL 32 (1994)). Judge Kozinski is known for sensitivity to the cultural
significance of parties appearing in his courtroom. See, e.g., White v. Samsung
Elec. America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1408 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging that “[f]or better or worse, we are the Court of
Appeals for the Hollywood Circuit”).
156. See Mattel Order, 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1408.
157. See id.
158. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 909. The entire lyrics for Barbie Girl by Aqua
are as follows:
-Hiya Barbie!
-Hi Ken!
-You wanna go for a ride?
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commenting on a stereotyped Barbie life. The song was
released in the United States, and by September 1997, Aqua
was on its way to notoriety and fame: Aquarium, sold over 1.4
159
Eventually, “to
million copies in the United States alone.
160
Mattel’s dismay” Barbie Girl made it to the Top 40.
Mattel brought suit, alleging eleven causes of action,
161
including federal and state trademark dilution claims.

-Sure, Ken!
-Jump in!
-Ha ha ha ha!
(CHORUS:)
I’m a Barbie girl, in my Barbie world
Life in plastic, it’s fantastic
You can brush my hair, undress me everywhere
Imagination, life is your creation
Come on Barbie, let’s go party!
(CHORUS)
I’m a blonde bimbo girl, in a fantasy world
Dress me up, make it tight, I’m your dolly
You’re my doll, rock and roll, feel the glamour in pink
Kiss me here, touch me there, hanky-panky
You can touch, you can play
If you say “I’m always yours,” ooh ooh
(CHORUS)
(BRIDGE:)
Come on, Barbie, let’s go party, ah ah ah yeah
Come on, Barbie, let’s go party, ooh ooh, ooh ooh
Come on, Barbie, let’s go party, ah ah ah yeah
Come on, Barbie, let’s go party, ooh ooh, ooh ooh
Make me walk, make me talk, do whatever you please
I can act like a star, I can beg on my knees
Come jump in, be my friend, let us do it again
Hit the town, fool around, let’s go party
You can touch, you can play
You can say “I’m always yours”
You can touch, you can play
You can say “I’m always yours”
(BRIDGE)
(CHORUS x2)
(BRIDGE)
-Oh, I’m having so much fun!
-Well, Barbie, we’re just getting started!
-Oh, I love you Ken!
Id.
159. See Mattel Order, 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1408.
160. Mattel, 296 F.3d. at 899.
161. See Mattel Order, 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1408. Specifically, Mattel alleged
federal dilution claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1123(c)(1) (Supp. 1997) (owner of a
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Interestingly, Mattel did not sue Aqua or the band members
individually, claiming that it was “not attempting to ‘censor’
the song, . . . [just] the companies that actually manufactured
162
and distributed the CD.” Mattel took the position that Barbie
was “associated with wholesomeness” and that MCA’s song was
“antisocial . . . [because] Barbie Girl supports ‘promiscuity,
lewdness, and the stereotyping and denigration of young
163
Mattel claimed the Barbie Girl portrayal tarnished
women.’”
164
the Barbie trademark and attempted to draw similarities
between the Barbie Girl lyrics and other sexually explicit
parodies including a pornographic Dallas Cowboy cheerleader
165
movie and a sexually explicit Pillsbury doughpersons cartoon.
At trial, MCA defended the federal dilution claims
primarily on the grounds that its speech was protected under
166
the “noncommercial use of a mark” exception to the FTDA.
The trial court agreed, noting: “mere association of a trademark
with ‘unwholesome or negative context’ is [not] enough to make
167
In addition, the trial court
a trademark dilution claim.”
cautiously explained that, “applying the trademark dilution law
168
to parodies . . . raises important First Amendment questions.”
The trial court claimed that it “must be wary” of applying the
dilution statute, otherwise it would permit mark holders to

famous mark entitled to injunctive relief), and state dilution claims under
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §14330 (1997) (likelihood of injury is grounds for
injunctive relief, not withstanding absence of competition). Mattel Order, 46
U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1419 (emphasis added).
162. 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1408 n.1.
163. Id. at 1419 (quoting Pl.’s Prelim. Inj. Mot. at 25).
164. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1155
(1998) (hereinafter Mattel Trial). However, the trial court noted that Mattel
itself had been accused of “promoting unrealistic, sexist stereotypes of what
constitutes the ‘ideal woman’” and that a book copyrighted by Mattel had
included several less than wholesome descriptions of Barbie along with
acknowledgments of Barbie’s unrealistic body proportions. Id.
165. See Mattel Order, 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1419 (citing Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.1979)
(holding defendant liable for using cheerleader uniform in X-rated film) and
Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 136 (N.D.Ga.
1981) (holding defendant liable under State anti-dilution statute for
publishing cartoon of “Poppin’ Fresh” and “Poppie Fresh” doughpersons
engaging in sexual intercourse and fellatio)).
166. Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1155; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B)
(2000).
167. Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (relying in general on the court’s
analysis in L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir.
1987)).
168. Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
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obtain dilution injunctions “simply because they find such
169
parodies ‘negative or offensive.’” The trial court attempted to
170
171
distinguish between Balducci Publications and L.L. Bean.
The defendant in Balducci Publications attacked the plaintiff,
Anheuser-Busch, in a way “not even remotely necessary to
Balducci’s goals of commenting on [a specific] oil spill [in a
172
However, in L.L.
water supply source used by the plaintiff].”
Bean and the Mattel case, both defendants used plaintiffs
trademark because it was “necessary for the purposes of
173
As a result, the trial court granted summary
parody.”
174
judgment for MCA on Mattel’s dilution claim and rested its
analysis on the noncommercial use exception simply to avoid
175
the obvious constitutional question.
Mattel appealed the decision, arguing that Barbie Girl
diluted Mattel’s mark in two ways: “[i]t diminishes the mark’s
capacity to identify and distinguish Mattel products, and
tarnishes the mark because the song is inappropriate for young
176
girls.” The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the FTDA paid homage
177
to Schechter’s contribution and also noted the distinction
between an ordinary trademark injunction (requiring a
likelihood of confusion) and a dilution injunction (requiring no
178
This distinction accords with the Allied
such showing).

169. Id. (quoting L.L. Bean Inc., 811 F.2d at 33).
170. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’n, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
171. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir.
1987).
172. Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 n.56 (quoting Balducci Publ’ns, 28
F.3d at 778) (alteration in original).
173. Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 n.56; accord, Pearson, supra note
40, at 1007 (explaining that “[a] parody must make its viewer realize what it is
poking fun at” and asserting that “[f]or a parody to conjure the image of the
subject mark . . . it will have to bear substantial similarity to it”). See
generally GINSBURG, supra note 44, at 874-915 (presenting various parody
cases).
174. See Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
175. See generally, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY &
ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 873-89 (3d. ed. 2001) (discussing Nat’l Labor
Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (interpreting
the National Labor Relations Act and its definition of “employer”) and the
canon that courts should interpret statutes to avoid constitutional problems).
ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY examines how this canon has been abused in the
commercial speech context in Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985). ESKRIDGE &
FRICKEY at 884-85.
176. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902-03.
177. Id. at 903.
178. See id.
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179

Maintenance court’s precipitous decision.
The Mattel court
180
adopted Judge Leval’s “lucid and scholarly” analysis of the
181
statutory terms in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.
The
Nabisco court explained that the FTDA established five
182
The Mattel court,
necessary elements for a dilution claim.
following Nabisco, concluded that, “Barbie easily qualifies
183
The
under the FTDA as a famous and distinctive mark.”
Mattel court also asserted that Barbie Girl constituted a
184
“commercial use in commerce” because MCA “created and
sold to consumers in the marketplace commercial products . . .
185
The court then announced,
[bearing] the Barbie mark.”
without fanfare, that MCA’s use was dilutitive because, when
some consumers hear Barbie’s name, they will think of both the
186
“To be dilutitive, use of the mark need not
doll and the song.
bring to mind the junior user alone,” because the mark is
187
diluted “if [it] no longer brings to mind the senior user alone.”

179. See id; see supra note 44, and note 51 and accompanying text
(distinguishing between trademark infringement and trademark dilution and
their importance in the history of trademark dilution theory).
180. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903.
181. 191 F.3d 208, 214-17 (2d Cir. 1999).
182. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215. The court stated that “(1) the senior
mark must be famous; (2) it must be distinctive; (3) the junior use must be a
commercial use in commerce; (4) it must begin after the senior mark has
become famous; and (5) it must cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the
senior mark.” Id. The Nabisco court did not examine the “commercial use in
commerce” requirement, stating that “it [is not] disputed that Nabisco’s sale of
its goldfish cracker would involve a commercial use in commerce.” Id.
(internal quotes omitted).
183. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903.
184. The court defined “commercial use in commerce” as “a use of a famous
and distinctive mark to sell goods other than those produced or authorized by
the mark’s owner.” Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903 (citing Panavision Int’l, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324-25 (9th Cir. 1998)). In Panavision, Toeppen
registered the internet domain name “panavision.com” along with the domain
Id. at 1319.
names of other large corporations.
When Panavision
International, L.P. attempted to register its own name, Toeppen attempted to
sell the domain name to Panavision. Id. The defendant argued that his use of
“Panavision” was not commercial, but the court disagreed noting that
“Toeppen traded on the value of Panavision’s mark.” Panavision, 141 F.3d
1318, 1325. MCA’s actions were distinct from Toeppen’s. The Mattel court did
not find that MCA traded on the value of the Barbie mark to sell records.
Instead, MCA sold records that contained songs about, among other things,
Barbie’s materially plastic fantasy world. Simply put, MCA’s purpose behind
its use of the Barbie mark was only weakly commercial.
185. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903.
186. See id. at 904.
187. Id. (emphasis added).
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The court noted that this was an example of a “classic blurring
injury and is in no way diminished by the fact that the song
188
itself refers back to Barbie the doll.”
The court declined to
189
decide whether Barbie Girl tarnished Mattel’s mark.
The Ninth Circuit then considered the statutory
exemptions listed in the FTDA and their applicability to MCA’s
190
As the court noted, the “comparative advertising”
actions.
and “news reporting and commentary” exemptions simply did
191
However, the noncommercial use
not apply to the facts here.
192
exemption posed a tougher question.
The court remarked
that defining the term “commercial use” to be the same
whether determining a “commercial use in commerce” or a
“noncommercial use” creates a constitutional problem “because
it would leave the FTDA with no First Amendment protection
for dilutitive speech other than comparative advertising and
193
news reporting.”
The lack of First Amendment protection troubled the Ninth
Circuit because it viewed the FTDA as lacking two significant
limitations to reduce the tension between traditional
trademark infringement actions and First Amendment rights.
First, the court argued simplistically that dilution injunctions
apply across a broader range of industries than trademark
194
Second, the court argued that trademark
injunctions.

188. Id.
189. See id. at 904, n.5 (remarking that “[b]ecause we find blurring, we
need not consider whether the song also tarnished the Barbie mark”)
(emphasis added). This is crucial because, as explained in Part III, use of the
Barbie mark in the title results in dilutitive blurring with relatively little First
Amendment tension compared to an expressive use of the Barbie mark and its
resulting dilutitive tarnishment injury.
190. See id. at 904.
191. Id.
192. See id. According to the Mattel court, the statutory language is
somewhat contradictory. If dilution can only occur by commercial use, how
can such use also be noncommercial and earn an exemption under 15 U.S.C.
1125(c)(4)(B)? The court pointed out that “[i]f the term ‘commercial use’ had
the same meaning in both provisions, this would eliminate one of the three
statutory exemptions defined by this subsection, because any use found to be
dilutitive would, of necessity, not be noncommercial.” Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. The court argued that that trademark infringement provides
limited relief–only where the junior use is likely to confuse. Id. The court
contrasted this with dilution injunctions, which are not limited to competing
industries, and therefore “sweep across broad vistas of the economy.” Id. at
905. However, the court failed to acknowledge that with the increase in broad
brand label appeal, trademark infringement actions may also reach broadly
into unrelated goods and services. See e.g., Westchester Media v. PRL USA
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injunctions are premised “on the need to prevent consumer
confusion,” consistent with the First Amendment protection
195
principles.
However, the court then argued that, “dilution
law protects only the distinctiveness of the mark, which is
inherently less weighty than the dual interest of protecting
trademark owners and avoiding harm to consumers that is at
196
The Ninth Circuit then
the heart of every trademark claim.”
suggested that in order to reconcile this tension,
noncommercial speech must be defined in such a way that it
can be covered by the noncommercial use exemption and, at the
197
The
same time, constitute a commercial use in commerce.
court cited the FTDA’s legislative history as “suggest[ing] an
interpretation . . . that both solves our interpretive dilemma
198
and diminishes some First Amendment concerns.” The Ninth
Circuit defined noncommercial use as “a use that consists

Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 667 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding trademark
infringement claims by clothing manufacturer against magazine of the same
name). In Westchester Media, the Fifth Circuit, agreeing with the district
court, noted that the New POLO magazine could be perceived as being within
PRL’s “natural zone of expansion.” Id. at 666.
However, this is based on the weak concept that “[i]f consumers believe, even
though falsely, that the natural tendency of producers of the type of goods
marketed by the prior user is to expand into the market for the type of goods
marketed by the subsequent user, confusion may be likely.” Id. (quoting Elvis
Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 202 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 21 cmt. j (1995))). But brand
identities increasingly encompass a broad spectrum of lifestyle activities. For
example, if Ford Motor Co. started marketing Winchester Edition Ford
Explorers (the Ford Explorer is a popular midsize SUV, and Winchester
markets popular sporting rifles and shotguns), complete with special edition
shotgun, custom installed gun racks and bandolier style seat belts, would a
consumer be reasonably justified in believing that Ford’s natural zone of
expansion is gun manufacture? Yet with the broadening appeal and lifestyle
image of rugged/outdoors/sporting brands such as Ford and Winchester, the
“natural zone of expansion” grows ever widening. See The Int’l Owners Club
for the Range Rover Marque, Range Rover Holland & Holland, at
http://www.rrr.co.uk/series_ii/holland.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2003)
(describing a British luxury truck built and outfitted in collaboration with a
British luxury gun manufacturer). Thus, a trademark infringement injunction
also has the possibility of “sweeping across broad vistas of the economy.”
Contra Mattel, 296 F.3d at 904-905.
195. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905. The court properly noted that the First
Amendment does not protect commercial fraud. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). “Moreover,
avoiding harm to consumers is an important interest that is independent of
the senior user’s interest in protecting its business.” Id.
196. Mattel, 296 F.3d at. 905.
197. See id.
198. Id.
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entirely of noncommercial, or fully constitutionally protected,
199
The court’s special attention to the fact that the
speech.”
noncommercial use exemption applied only to entirely
noncommercial speech is important because it was this gray
area, in which noncommercial expression co-mingles with
commercial speech, that the Mattel court interpreted.
The Mattel court then examined the legislative history
behind the FTDA and properly determined that Congress was
aware of this issue and had dealt with the First Amendment
200
The court noted, in particular, House Judiciary
problem.
Committee language stating that “[t]he bill will not prohibit or
threaten ‘noncommercial’ expression, as that term has been
201
defined by the courts.” In fact, the section-by-section analysis
presented to the House and Senate was printed in the
Congressional Record to clarify that the noncommercial use
exemption was intended to relieve tension between the FTDA

199. Id. (emphasis added). The court cited an older version of Jerome
Gilson’s treatise, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, and emphasized
Gilson’s definition that the noncommercial use exemption applies only to fully
constitutionally protected speech, such as parodies. See GILSON, supra note
14, §5A.01[8][b].
200. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905.
201. See id. (quoting 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031) (emphasis added).
Clearly, the congressional understanding at the time the bill was debated was
that judicial interpretation of commercial speech doctrine was distinct from
noncommercial speech. What is also interesting is that this explanation seems
to acknowledge that the judicial definition could change. This might imply
that Congress assumed it was possible that in the future, even commercial
speech could be fully protected by the First Amendment. If this was true, then
we must accept as true that Congress believed that the Act it was signing into
law may become unconstitutional sometime in the future. It is more likely
that Congress was fixated on the concept that commercial transaction speech
would always deserve relatively less First Amendment protection than
“parody, satire, editorial and other forms of expression that are not a part of a
commercial transaction.” Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905 (citing 141 CONG. REC.
S19306-10, S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Orin Hatch);
141 CONG. REC. H14317-01, H14318 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Carlos Moorhead)). This interpretation is even more likely given that the
confusing 44 Liquormart decision (in which a fragmented Supreme Court
argued, but did not decide, whether commercial speech was constitutionally
distinct from noncommercial speech) was handed down after the FTDA
became law. See discussion on 44 Liquormart, supra notes 133-136 and
accompanying text. Most recently in Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that commercial and
noncommercial speech receive different levels of protection. 535 U.S. 357, 367
(2002) (holding 5-4 that the regulation at issue was unconstitutional but the
majority acknowledged that “not all regulation of [commercial] speech is
unconstitutional”).
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202

and First Amendment concerns.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit applied its understanding of the
noncommercial use exemption to MCA Records’ distribution of
203
Barbie Girl, which is a form of noncommercial expression.
The problem was that this court had previously identified the
act of selling the Barbie Girl recording for profit as a form of
204
Thus, the Mattel court had to find a way
commercial speech.
to treat speech that was both commercial and noncommercial
at the same time.
The Ninth Circuit relied on their recent decision in
205
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
In Hoffman, Los
Angeles Magazine (LAM) published a photo spread containing
206
digitally altered images from famous films. Dustin Hoffman’s
appearance in a Tootsie still was altered so that “Hoffman’s
body and his long-sleeved red sequined dress were replaced by
the body of a male model in the same pose, wearing a [Richard
Tyler] spaghetti-strapped, cream-colored, silk evening dress
207
Hoffman sued
and [Ralph Lauren] high-heeled sandals.”
LAM’s parent company under the Lanham Act, alleging
208
The Hoffman
misappropriation of his name and likeness.
court found that the magazine’s use was not purely commercial,
209
and therefore deserved full First Amendment protection.
The Mattel court noted that the Hoffman decision relied on
210
its interpretation of the purpose behind the magazine speech.
Since the Hoffman court found that there was a commercial
purpose behind the magazine’s message of humor and fun, it
concluded that where “commercial aspects are inextricably

202. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906.
203. See id. at 901 (stating “[Barbie Girl] pokes fun at Barbie and the
values that Aqua contends she represents”).
204. See id. at 903. See supra notes 184-185 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, the court’s reasoning was that “commercial use in commerce”
refers to “use of a famous and distinctive mark to sell goods other than those
produced or authorized by the mark’s owner.” Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903 (citing
Toeppen, 141 F.3d at 1324-25). However, as discussed supra in note 184, the
court did not assert that MCA’s purpose was to sell products with the Barbie
mark.
205. 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
206. See id. at 1183.
207. Id.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 1185-86.
210. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906. LAM clearly had a commercial purpose:
“to draw attention to the for-profit magazine in which it appeared and to sell
more copies.” Id. (citing Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186) (quotes omitted).
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entwined with expressive elements . . . they cannot be
211
separated out from the fully protected whole.”
The Mattel
court adopted this reasoning and found that “Barbie Girl [is]
not purely commercial speech, and is therefore fully
212
protected.”
To sum up the Ninth Circuit’s argument: the Mattel court
found that MCA’s use of Mattel’s mark had a commercial
purpose and constituted dilution under the FTDA. However,
because the use was also a form of noncommercial expression,
the noncommercial portion was exempt from the FTDA. This
noncommercial message deserved full First Amendment
213
Since the commercial aspect was “inextricably
protection.
entwined” with the noncommercial message, the song deserved
full First Amendment protection, and therefore MCA’s
distribution of Barbie Girl was fully protected. As noted in the
introduction, there is no question that the result is correct:
MCA should not be enjoined from distributing Barbie Girl.
However, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning allows any protected
expression that is “inextricably entwined” within commercial
speech to claim exemption under the FTDA’s noncommercial
use exemption.
III.ANALYSIS AND IMPACT
A. THE MATTEL COURT FAILED TO COMPLETELY ANALYZE
MATTEL’S DILUTION CLAIM.
The Mattel court’s failure to follow through completely in
its analysis of the dilution issues caused the court to compare

211. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185 (internal quotes omitted). The Hoffman
court supported its reasoning by observing that “‘[t]here are common sense
differences between speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction and other varieties,’ and commonsense tells us this is not a simple
advertisement.” Id. at 1185-86 (quoting Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976)). The
Hoffman court noted that if the altered image had appeared in a Ralph
Lauren advertisement, then the speech might be purely commercial because
“[s]uch use[] do[es] not implicate the First Amendment’s protection of
expressions of editorial opinion.” Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185. See, e.g.,
Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1998) (use of
pitcher’s image in printed beer advertisement).
212. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906-07.
213. This is not to say that all noncommercial messages get absolute
protection. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema,
Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding defendant liable for
commenting on cheerleader uniforms in X-rated film).
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the commercial aspects of Mattel’s claim with noncommercial
aspects of Barbie Girl. Although this appears sound, this
section will explain that the court should have recognized that
the FTDA protects different types of dilution and, consequently,
should have understood that blurring and tarnishment
implicate different levels of First Amendment protection. This
section contends that the Mattel court should have considered
both Mattel’s FTDA rights with respect to dilutitive blurring
and dilutitive tarnishment, against MCA’s First Amendment
rights. As a result, the court should have found that Mattel’s
dilutitive blurring injury was insignificant due to MCA’s
relatively low commercial interest in the Barbie mark, and that
MCA’s expressive rights heavily outweighed Mattel’s dilutitive
tarnishment injury.
1. FTDA protection.
The first important realization is that the FTDA protects
goodwill directly associated with the commercial value of
214
The
trademarks because that value itself is worth protecting.
proposition that brand goodwill is economically valuable and
215
Dilution protection is
monetarily measurable is not novel.
based on a recognition that economic parcelization of rights is
more efficient as the number of economic participants and
216
Thus, trademarks have a
system complexity increases.
property-like quality that is associated with the products and
services marketed using that mark (i.e., the associated going
concern).
This realization is the result of economic changes in the
national economy and reflects the age-old importance of
investment protection. The Industrial Revolution created an
economic and industrial infrastructure efficient enough to allow
mass production and cheap transportation of goods—goods that
were distributed nationally and required trademarks to

214. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, ET.AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 562-63 (2d ed., 2000) (defining goodwill as “the
economic value of consumers’ associations with a firm and its trademark”).
215. See id. (noting that some estimates put the value of the Coca Cola
trademark at $24 billion, while the Marlboro brand is estimated to be worth
$65 billion); see Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir.
1999) (stating that “the stimulant effect of a distinctive and well-known mark
is a powerful selling tool that deserves legal protection”) (internal quotes
omitted). See generally Muller, supra note 76, at 175.
216. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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217

“convey[] important information about the products.”
Schechter recognized that trademarks derived their value from
218
their ability to make products stand out in the sea of goods.
The mark could act as a “silent salesman that reaches over the
shoulder of the retailer and across the latter’s counter, straight
219
220
to the consumer.” The Allied Maintenance court recognized
that trademarks should be protected based on their intrinsic
221
Finally, Congress recognized that dilution directly
value.
affects the investment in the advertising value of a mark and
222
attempted to incorporate this concept into the FTDA.
Protecting trademarks against dilution and treating them
as valuable, property-like rights associated with a going
concern is significant because it interstitially protects that
which the traditional direct trademark infringement theory
223
This distinction is based on the notion, articulated
does not.
by the Allied Maintenance court, that “relief may be difficult to
secure in situations in which the parties are not in competition,
224
nor produce similar products or perform similar services.”
The importance of this distinction relies on the recognition that
225
As a
the FTDA protects only famous and distinctive marks.
result, there is an incentive to create and promote trademarks
226
At the same
because of their perceived advertising power.
time, the interests of new mark holders seeking entry into the
227
market are protected because the FTDA applies to only a
228
limited number of “Supermarks.”
Thus, the FTDA’s broad

217. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 854; see supra notes 31, 40 and
accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
219. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 854.
220. Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162
(N.Y. 1977).
221. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
224. 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977); see supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
225. See supra text accompanying note 61, and note 62 and accompanying
text.
226. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text; cf. Klieger, supra note
24, at 862 (contending that “[d]ilution law . . . encourages overinvestment in
the cultivation of brand imagery”); Muller, supra note 76, at 175 (contending
that “[i]nvestment in valuable trademark assets by mark holders is vital to
encourage a healthy and robust economy”).
227. Contra Klieger, supra note 24, at 856.
228. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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229

protection is tempered by its limited applicability. This is
particularly important because it allows the FTDA to extend
protection to marks that are commonly understood to have
230
substantial economic value, even across completely unrelated
industries. Finally, the real and perceived constraint to society
231
from dilution law’s anticompetitive effects is reduced, and
that allows the FTDA to accommodate the valuable propertylike rights that inhere in trademarks. This is not to suggest
that trademarks should be protected in gross. Rather, the
FTDA simply recognizes the property-like value of trademarks
associated with a going concern.
2. Tarnishment is not Blurring.
The second important realization is that the FTDA’s
protection against dilution encompasses both tarnishment and
blurring type injuries, and that these injuries are
distinguishable in the manner in which they implicate the First
Amendment. Dilutitive blurring rarely implicates the First
Amendment because the junior user’s use occurs through his
commercially motivated desire to trade on the goodwill
232
The junior user is generally not
associated with the mark.
233
using the mark as an expressive vehicle.
For instance, in
234
OBH, the junior user of “www.thebuffalonews.com” intended
to momentarily mislead consumers into associating the
“Buffalo News” mark with the defendant’s apartment search
website. Similarly, in Nabisco, the court held that Pepperidge
Farm’s goldfish-shaped, cheese-flavored snack cracker was a
235
Even if Nabisco’s
distinct, valuable and protectable mark.
similarly shaped and flavored cracker was produced with better
quality and tastier ingredients, Pepperidge Farm would still be
injured through dilutitive blurring because consumers would
no longer immediately associate goldfish crackers with the
Pepperidge Farm products; thus Pepperidge Farm’s mark
would not bring to mind the senior user alone, and the

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
2000).
235.

See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See generally Klieger, supra note 24, at 851-60.
See supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
Id.
OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp.2d 176 (W.D.N.Y.
See supra text accompanying notes 94, 95.
See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 226 (2d Cir. 1999).
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associated property-like value would be decreased.
Clearly,
blurring impedes a senior mark holder’s ability to utilize the
mark as marketing tool even in situations where the junior
user may engender positive consumer response in the senior
mark.
In contrast, dilutitive tarnishment may implicate First
Amendment concerns more often because the junior user’s
comment on the mark may simultaneously dilute by creating
237
For instance,
negative associations in the consumer’s mind.
238
in Am. Dairy Queen, the defendant’s use of “Dairy Queens”
239
was explicitly void of any commentary about ADQ itself.
The
dilutitive tarnishment injury resulted entirely from the
negative association between a potentially offensive film and
ADQ’s wholesome image, and a dilution injunction would not
240
infringe significantly on New Line’s expressive rights.
However, in comparison, if New Line’s use of “Dairy Queens”
had been intended to poke fun at Midwestern pop culture, then
clearly its tarnishing use directly implicates New Line’s First
Amendment rights and a dilution injunction would clearly
infringe on New Line’s expressive rights. Similarly, the Fifth
241
Circuit in Westchester Media recognized that the defendant
magazine’s use of PRL USA’s “Polo” mark was both expressive
242
The court was able to balance these
and non-expressive.
competing rights because the consumers in that case were
“relatively sophisticated,” and magazine disclaimers would be
243
effective in preserving the distinctiveness of PRL’s mark.
Complete analysis of the dilution injury was key to each
court’s decision in Am. Dairy Queen, OBH, and Westchester
Media. In each of these cases, the junior use of the mark
contained at least one instance of source identification for the
junior user that was separable from expressive commentary

236. See supra text accompanying note 187. Furthermore, Nabisco did not
attempt to comment on the Pepperidge Farm’s mark. This absolutely removes
any First Amendment rights Nabisco may have had in using Pepperidge
Farm’s goldfish cracker mark.
237. See supra notes 84-87, 98-102 and accompanying text.
238. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prod., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727
(D.Minn. 1998).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
241. Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings., Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir.
2000).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 107, 108.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 111, 112.
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244

about the mark. Each court examined the non-expressive use
and allotted sufficient protection to the mark holder in order to
245
protect its valuable right to exclusivity.
The Mattel court did not provide an extensive analysis.
The court stopped looking for dilutitive injury after
246
In the court’s view,
determining that there was blurring.
MCA’s interest in commenting on Mattel’s mark was directly
opposed to Mattel’s interest in protecting the property-like
247
value associated with its Barbie mark. The court should have
248
examined, analogously to the Nabisco court, the dilutitive
blurring injury of Mattel’s trademark interests as affected by
MCA’s purely commercial interest in profiting from the Barbie
249
Similarly, the court should have examined,
mark.
250
analogously to the Am. Dairy Queen court, MCA’s expressive
interest in relation to Mattel’s dilutitive tarnishment
251
If the court had followed this analysis, it would
concerns.

244. In Am. Dairy Queen, the defendant film company used “Dairy Queens”
to identify its “mockumentary.” See supra notes 88, 89 and accompanying
text. In OBH, the defendant website operator created initial interest
confusion by using “www.thebuffalonews.com” to lead consumers to its
website. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. In Westchester Media, the
defendant magazine used “Polo” to identify its magazine. See supra note 107
and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 94, 95, 110 and accompanying text.
246. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d. 894, 904 n.5 (stating
“[b]ecause we find blurring, we need not consider whether the song also
tarnished the Barbie mark”).
247. See supra notes 210-212 and accompanying text.
248. Nabisco Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
249. Cf. id. at 218 (rejecting Nabisco’s argument that differences in
packaging are sufficient to distinguish the products because of the court’s
concern over post-sale confusion leading to actionable dilution). The issue the
court was grappling with here is that Nabisco’s crackers could eat up
Pepperidge Farm’s market share even when served out of the box. Therefore,
Nabisco’s claim that packaging alone was sufficient to differentiate the
products was ineffective. Nabisco’s commercial interest was tied to the
tangible reproduction of a goldfish-shaped cracker, not the marketing
association with the CatDog show. Id. (stating “[c]onsumers] will recognize a
fish reminiscent of Pepperidge Farm’s fish”).
250. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prod., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727
(D.Minn. 1998).
251. Cf. id. at 734-35 (noting that the crucial distinction in New Line’s
position was that it did not claim that any expressive message was contained
in its title choice, and that if it had, the “balance between the public’s interest
in free expression and its interest in avoiding . . . trademark dilution” could
tilt in favor of free expression). The court specifically noted that the injunction
would only effect a “minute restriction on expression, but will do much to
avoid . . . dilution.” Id. at 735.
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have found that Mattel’s dilutitive blurring injury was
insignificant and tempered by MCA’s claimed lack of
252
commercial intent to profit from its use of the Barbie mark.
Furthermore, the court would have found that Mattel’s
tarnishment injury was relatively small in light of Barbie Girl’s
253
significant expressive purpose.
In addition, the Mattel court failed to recognize that
254
Hoffman,
on which the Mattel court relied so heavily,
extensively analyzed both the commercial and non-commercial
255
aspects of Los Angeles Magazine’s use of Hoffman’s image.
The Hoffman court found that the defendant magazine’s use
contained an express intention to attract attention and
256
Thus, the defendant
simultaneously comment on Hoffman.
intentionally entwined its commercial and non-commercial
speech. In comparison, the Am. Dairy Queen court easily
separated the commercial and non-commercial elements of New
257
Line’s proposed title, “Dairy Queens,” because New Line’s
258
intent was explicit.
In contrast, the Mattel court found
MCA’s use was primarily non-commercial expression, and only
259
The song was
cursorily mentioned MCA’s commercial intent.

252. Cf. Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1138 (discussing statements about
the original songwriter’s intentions). The court noted that a certain minimum
level of commercial interest is present in all writing. Cf. id. at 1137 n.17
(quoting Samuel Johnson’s observation that “[n]o man but a blockhead ever
wrote, except for money”).
253. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
254. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
255. See id. at 1185-86 (analyzing the commercial and non-commercial
aspects of the advertisement, and concluding that the magazine intentionally
drew attention to itself while simultaneously commenting on Hoffman’s role in
Tootsie); see also supra note 210 and accompanying text.
256. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185-86.
257. See Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d at 735 (holding that the
speech was primarily non-commercial with a small commercial component).
258. The Am. Dairy Queen court reasoned that “the somewhat lesser
protection afforded commercial speech” allowed the court to balance the
“public’s interest in free expression and its interest in avoiding . . . trademark
dilution.” Id. The Am. Dairy Queen court concluded that “[a]n injunction here
will only effect a minute restriction on expression, but will do much to avoid
confusion and dilution.” Id.
259. Cf. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902 (stating “[t]he only indication that Mattel
might be associated with the song is the use of Barbie in the title”). The only
other mention of MCA’s commercial intentions occurs in the court’s holding:
Hoffman controls: Barbie Girl is not purely commercial speech, and is
therefore fully protected. To be sure, MCA used Barbie’s name to sell
copies of the song. However, as we’ve already observed, see pp. 901-02
supra, the song also lampoons the Barbie image and comments
humorously on the cultural values Aqua claims she represents. Use
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written and conceived with its expressive purpose as the
primary motivation, and its commercial intent was of only
260
minor importance.
Thus, the Mattel court should not have
treated MCA’s commercial and non-commercial speech as being
261
Instead, the Mattel court should
“inextricably entwined.”
have considered MCA’s primary motivation – non-commercial
commentary – and found that the commercial and noncommercial elements were separable, just as they were in Am.
262
Dairy Queen.
Therefore, the Mattel court’s reliance on
Hoffman was misplaced.
Finally, if the Mattel court had conducted its FTDA
analysis under the distinction between dilutitive blurring and
dilutitive tarnishment, it would have had stronger grounds for
263
denying Mattel’s demand for injunctive relief. Mattel’s FTDA
claim would still have failed because, as the court correctly
noted, MCA’s use of Mattel’s mark was primarily connected to
the band’s commentary about the values it contends Barbie
264
Further justification for the court’s analysis
stands for.
would be that Mattel did not try to alter the song’s lyrics, nor
265
did Mattel seek injunctive relief against the band itself. Most
266
importantly, the FTDA’s non-commercial use exemption was
included to cover dilutitive tarnishment resulting from non267
The legislative history
commercial use of another’s mark.

of the Barbie mark in the song Barbie Girl therefore falls within the
noncommercial use exemption to the FTDA.
Id. at 906-07 (emphasis added).
260. See Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1138; see also supra note 252.
261. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906 (quoting Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185)
(emphasis added).
262. See supra notes 257, 258 and accompanying text.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 252, 253.
264. See Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp.2d at 1138 (quoting Soren Rasted, Barbie
Girl’s primary writer as stating that he wanted “to compose a humorous song
about the Barbie fantasy world”) (quotes and emphasis omitted). He
proceeded to describe the song as a “criminally funny sonic riff on the overendowed queen of pop culture.” Id. at 1139 n.23.
265. See supra text accompanying note 162. Even Mattel evidently
realized that the song was an expressive work and seeking a dilution
injunction against the band would be useless. See id.
266. See supra text accompanying note 72.
267. The non-commercial use exemption covers non-commercial use in
commerce of another’s mark. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted
in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031. The relevant passage states that:
The proposal adequately addresses legitimate First Amendment
concerns espoused by the broadcasting industry and the media. The
bill will not prohibit or threaten “noncommercial” expression, as that
term has been defined by the courts. Nothing in this bill is intended
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clearly states that “[n]othing in this bill is intended to alter
existing case law on the subject of what constitutes
268
‘commercial’ speech.”
Even the Mattel court recognized that
the “noncommercial use exemption does not . . . apply to
269
This recognition is crucial because it
commercial speech.”
underlies the central problem with the Mattel court’s
270
reasoning. The Mattel court found dilution through blurring.
Blurring implicates primarily commercial motives and
271
However, the Mattel
generally involves commercial speech.
court denied injunctive relief on the grounds that MCA’s speech
was primarily non-commercial and therefore exempt under the
272
non-commercial use exemption.
Thus the court’s denial of
injunctive relief for dilutitive blurring under the noncommercial use exemption contradicts the court’s earlier
recognition that the exemption applies only to non-commercial
speech. If the exemption was truly limited to non-commercial
speech then the Mattel Court should have granted injunctive
relief because MCA’s speech was both commercial and noncommercial.
Without doubt, MCA’s use was non-commercial
273
even though it simultaneously used Mattel’s
expression,
274
mark for commercial purposes in commerce.
Mattel’s
insignificant blurring injury, and relatively small dilutitive
tarnishment injury, was heavily outweighed by MCA’s strong
275
This analysis would
First Amendment expressive interests.
leave room to grant dilution injunctions when, notwithstanding

to alter existing case law on the subject of what constitutes
“commercial” speech. The bill includes specific language exempting
from liability the “fair use” of a mark in the context of comparative
commercial advertising or promotion as well as all forms of news
reporting and news commentary. The latter provision which was
added to H.R. 1295 as a result of an amendment offered by
Congressman Moorhead that was adopted by the Committee,
recognize[d] the heightened First Amendment protection afforded the
news industry.
Id.
268. Id. (emphasis added).
269. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905 n.7.
270. See id. at 904 n.5.
271. See supra Section I.B.3.
272. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 907 (stating “[u]se of the Barbie mark in the song
Barbie Girl . . . falls within the noncommercial use exemption”); see generally
supra notes 192-212 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 203, 264 and accompanying text.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 184, 185.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 252, 253.

2003]

SPEECH-ZILLA MEETS TRADEMARK KONG?

331

some minimal level of First Amendment content, the dilutitive
blurring injury is significant because the junior user’s primary
interest is commercial. This would be analogous to the Nabisco
facts where the court found that Pepperidge Farm’s dilutitive
blurring injury weighed in favor of an injunction because
276
Any artistic
Nabisco’s primary interest was commercial.
First Amendment interest Nabisco had in marketing goldfish
shaped crackers was easily outweighed by Pepperidge Farm’s
interest in maintaining the property-like value of its
277
278
Similarly, the Am. Dairy Queen
trademarked cracker.
court granted an injunction against defendant New Line
because they conceded that there was no expressive content in
279
Although ADQ’s injury was primarily
its chosen title.
through dilutitive tarnishment, Am. Dairy Queen illustrates
that a dilutitive interest can outweigh a First Amendment
expressive interest.
Going back to the “Cadillac of toilets” hypothetical posed in
280
this article’s introduction, a court following the Mattel line of
reasoning would consider American Standard’s expressive right
to use Cadillac’s mark and weigh that right directly against
Cadillac’s investment interest in its mark. A Mattel analysis
would find that American Standard’s use constitutes a
commercial use in commerce: “Cadillac” is used to sell
American Standard products. At the same time, American
Standard’s use is non-commercial: “Cadillac” emanates
American Standard’s views about American-made luxury
products. Thus, a Mattel analysis would find that because the
commercial and non-commercial speech are inextricably
entwined (both messages emanate from the same mark),
American Standard’s use would be excepted under the FTDA’s
non-commercial use exemption and no injunction would issue.
In contrast, under the reasoning proposed by this

276. See Nabisco Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 225 (2d Cir. 1999).
277. Cf. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 900 (stating “[w]hatever first amendment
rights you may have in calling the brew you make in your bathtub ‘Pepsi’ are
easily outweighed by the buyer’s interest in not being fooled into buying it”)
(quoting Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L.REV. 960, 973
(1993)). Both assertions rely on the rationale behind the respective theory
(dilution of infringement) and weigh the interest against the First
Amendment.
278. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prod., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727
(D.Minn. 1998).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 100, 101.
280. See supra Introduction.
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comment, Cadillac is faced with a more sinister problem than
ADQ because American Standard’s use is primarily
commercial, like New Line’s use, but American Standard’s
expressive use is secondary and incorporates its own
281
commercial motivation to associate its toilets with Cadillac.
Remember that New Line conceded that its junior use lacked
282
If a court analyzes the separate types of
expressive content.
283
injury as this comment proposes, it would find that Cadillac’s
dilutitive blurring injury is significant given the substantial
commercial intent behind American Standard’s use.
Furthermore, American Standard’s relatively minor expressive
interest would be weighed against Cadillac’s substantial
investment in its trademark. Both issues are for the fact
finders, but it is clear that under this analysis, Cadillac is in a
relatively stronger position. It is important to note that
Cadillac could not get this far under Mattel: the Mattel court
would find that any non-commercial expression by American
284
Standard precludes an FTDA dilution injunction.
In sum, the distinction between dilutitive blurring and
dilutitive tarnishment implicates the First Amendment in
different and meaningful ways. The Mattel court failed to
appreciate this distinction, and as a result, completely
285
discounted Mattel’s property-like value in its mark. This was
in direct contravention to Congress’s intent to provide
protection for a trademark’s property-like value through the
286
FTDA.
B. TRADEMARK KONG LIVES
This section explains why the Mattel court’s statement that
“[i]f speech is not ‘purely commercial’ – that is, if it does more
than propose a commercial transaction – then it is entitled to

281. See supra Introduction; see e.g., supra text accompanying note 20.
282. New Line’s lack of expressive content meant that both dilution
injuries fall in ADQ’s favor. See text accompanying note 279. Here, American
Standard has a purported expressive use argument. A court failing to
examine the nature of that expressive use would fail to see that the argument
incorporates American Standard’s commercial intent. See supra Introduction.
283. See supra Section I.B.3.
284. See Mattel, 296 F.3d 906-07 (concluding that MCA’s speech is “not
purely commercial speech, and is therefore fully protected”).
285. See id.
286. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also supra Section
III.A.1.
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287

full First Amendment protection” could mean the end of any
substantive protection offered by the FTDA to owners of
288
The reason the court’s
famous and distinctive marks.
statement is so important to trademark dilution is that most
junior users combine both expressive commentary and
expression “related solely to the economic interests of the
289
when diluting senior marks. Thus, the court’s
speaker”
290
notion that “not purely commercial”
expression is fully
protected under the First Amendment means that most senior
mark holders will be unable to obtain an FTDA injunction. The
key to resolving Mattel’s First Amendment marginalization of
the FTDA is to recognize that the commercial speech doctrine
treats commercial speech as being lower on the First
291
However, as exhibited by the
Amendment hierarchy.
Supreme Court’s inconsistent treatment of commercial speech,
292
it is hard to say how much lower.
293
Central Hudson
stands for the proposition that the
government may restrict commercial speech if the restriction is
justified by a substantial government interest and the
294
Examination of
regulation directly advances that interest.
the legislative history behind the FTDA reveals that Congress’
was aware of the tension between the proposed Act and the
295
Congress justified the Act’s restriction on
First Amendment.

287. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906 (citing Hoffman v. Capital Ciies/ABC, Inc, 255
F.3d 1180, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
288. See generally supra Introduction (explaining the Cadillac hypothetical
and the absurd result from protecting American Standard’s interest in
espousing its views on American luxury consumerism).
289. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980). See also supra text accompanying note 199.
290. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906 (quotes omitted).
291. See supra notes 120, 121 and accompanying text (discussing Ohralik
and McGowan’s critique of the court’s underlying rationale). Notwithstanding
McGowan’s excellent argument, “speech” in the dilution cases often is a form
of economic activity and the Mattel court’s hostile FTDA treatment could be
construed as “using the First Amendment as a pretext for implementing [the
court’s] economic polices.” See McGowan, supra note 119, at 440. Therefore,
Jackson & Jeffries observation is relevant to the hierarchy of First
Amendment values: that “commercial speech is not ‘speech’ for first
amendment purposes, it is actually part of the economic marketplace and may
be regulated as economic activity.” Id.
292. See supra Section I.B.4.
293. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
294. See supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
295. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1031.
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commercial speech through the recognition of “the substantial
investment the owner has made in the mark and the
296
commercial value and aura of the mark itself.”
Furthermore,
the FTDA is limited in its applicability: it directly advances the
government’s interest and simultaneously accommodates First
Amendment concerns because it narrowly extends protection
297
Thus the FTDA meets
only to famous and distinctive marks.
the preliminary standard to validly restrict commercial speech
by Central Hudson.
Another important inquiry into understanding the
intersection between the FTDA and the First Amendment
commercial speech doctrine is “how much First Amendment
protection does commercial speech deserve?” The FTDA was
298
299
Kathleen
passed before 44 Liquormart was handed down.
Sullivan’s insightful analysis of the commercial speech doctrine
before 44 Liquormart points out that, commercial speech is
300
44 Liquormart was
protected, but is not fully protected.
arguably inconsistent with previous commercial speech cases
and appeared to signal a retreat from the idea that commercial
301
Nevertheless, 44
speech deserved less than full protection.
Liquormart was doctrinally important because it supported the
argument that commercial speech deserves the same protection
302
However, after 44
that non-commercial speech receives.
Liquormart, the Supreme Court seems to take a more moderate
303
approach in Thompson, affirming the Bolger Court’s holding
that commercial speech enjoys “qualified but nonetheless
304
The Bolger
substantial [First Amendment] protection.”
Court’s “substantial First Amendment protection” language
was
protective
of
the
advertisement’s
content
305
However, where the speech is related
(contraceptives).

296. Id. at 1030; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
298. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
299. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
300. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 127.
301. See id. at 126.
302. Id. (stating “after Liquormart, it is unclear why ‘commercial speech’
should continue to be treated as a separate category of speech isolated from
general First Amendment principles”).
303. See Thompson v. Western States Medical, 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002)
(stating “although commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment,
not all regulation of such speech is unconstitutional”).
304. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68.
305. See id. at 60.
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purely to the economic desire of the advertiser in contravention
to an asserted substantial governmental interest, it is clear
306
that the Court would be less likely to protect such speech.
Similarly, where the commercial speech is dilutitive, a court
should be less interested in protecting such speech under the
First Amendment because it is less central to people’s abilities
to express themselves and in direct contravention to an
307
However, this
asserted substantial governmental interest.
only tells us part of the reason why commercial speech receives
less than full First Amendment protection.
As illustrated above in Section I.B.3 and III.A.2, dilutitive
injury can occur through blurring and tarnishment.
Furthermore, dilutitive speech can consist of commercial and
non-commercial speech. In other words, the junior user’s
dilutitive use of a senior mark can consist of expressive
commentary about the senior mark combined with commercial
expression “related solely to the economic interests of the
308
Thus, there is a hierarchy of dilutitive use
speaker.”
309
situations as follows:
Dilutitive use that tarnishes, and consists of:
1. Only expressive commentary – implicates full First
Amendment protection.
2. Some expressive commentary and some commercial
expression – implicates balancing between both of
the following:
N Expressive commentary implicates full First
Amendment protection
N Commercial expression implicates the Bolger
standard of less than full First Amendment
protection under the commercial speech
doctrine

306. See TRAUTH & HUFFMAN, supra note 114, at 109-111. The Posadas
Court distinguished “Carey and Bigelow [because] the underlying conduct that
was the subject of the advertising restrictions was constitutionally
protected . . . [whereas] the Puerto Rico Legislature surely could have
prohibited casino gambling.” Id. at 110.
307. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030-1031.
308. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
309. On this scale, using the Ohralik concept of the First Amendment
hierarchy, Situation #1 (only expressive commentary) receives the fullest First
Amendment protection and Situation #4 (only commercial expression) receives
the level of First Amendment protection dictated by the current
understanding of the commercial speech doctrine. See Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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Dilutitive use that blurs, and consists of:
3. Some commercial expression and some expressive
commentary – implicates balancing between both of
the following:
N Expressive commentary implicates full First
Amendment protection
N Commercial expression implicates the Bolger
standard of less than full First Amendment
protection under the commercial speech
doctrine
310
– implicates the
4. Only commercial expression
Bolger standard of less than full First Amendment
protection under the commercial speech doctrine.
It is clear from this hierarchy that a court must analyze
the relative amounts of expressive and commercial speech
occurring in the junior user’s dilutitive use and compare that
with the type of dilution, thus determining the relative
amounts of dilution. This also emphasizes the importance for
future courts of examining fully the distinct dilutitive injuries
311
that arise from the different junior uses of a senior mark.
Therefore, Mattel court should have first examined the
types of speech, and then the types of dilution claimed. Under
this method, the Mattel court should have found that MCA’s
expressive speech, combined with very little commercial
312
is very close to the Situation #1 on the above
speech
hierarchy (only expressive commentary). Furthermore, in
examining the types of blurring, the Mattel court would have
found that Mattel’s claim for dilutitive blurring in fact supports
a finding for MCA because blurring implicates Situation #3,
both commercial and non-commercial speech. Commercial
speech is lower on Ohralik’s First Amendment hierarchy than
expressive speech and MCA’s expressive speech was a
significant part of its total speech. Therefore the Mattel court
was justified in denying the dilution injunction on First

310. If Jackson & Jeffries are correct that “commercial speech is not
‘speech’ for first amendment purposes” then only commercial speech in the
hierarchy above raises no first amendment concerns. This is exactly the result
shown in Nabisco: Nabisco’s dilutitive blurring use did not implicate any First
Amendment concerns because its use could be thought of as only commercial
speech and therefore there is no First Amendment concern. See Jackson &
Jeffries, supra note 121.
311. See supra text accompanying note 100.
312. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
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313

Amendment grounds.
In contrast, going back to the “Cadillac of toilets”
314
hypothetical posed in this article’s introduction, a court using
the above hierarchy would be justified in giving American
Standard’s “Made in the U.S.A.” argument relatively little
weight because Cadillac’s injury stems primarily from dilutitive
blurring.
Dilutitive blurring involves relatively little
315
expressive commentary and so a court would be justified in
discounting American Standard’s First Amendment defense.
Thus a court would be justified in granting Cadillac’s dilution
injunction notwithstanding American Standard’s First
Amendment defense, represented by Situation #4.
In sum, the Mattel court’s statement that any speech that
“is not ‘purely commercial’ . . . is entitled to full First
Amendment protection” should be construed very narrowly and
316
First, the First
treated as an endpoint along a continuum.
Amendment should be weighed to gauge what kinds of speech
are present. Then that speech should be weighed against the
FTDA and only in rare cases will one absolutely preclude the
other’s rights. For example, when the commercial speech does
not consist of sensitive content but instead is the expressed
commercial intention to trade on the goodwill of another’s
mark, then relatively little, if any, commercial First
317
In contrast, when the nonAmendment concern is raised.
commercial expression comments on the senior user’s mark and
contains sensitive content, the strongest non-commercial First
318
With these distinctions
Amendment protections are raised.
in mind, the conclusion is significant that First Amendment
rights, although powerful, do not apply universally to all
trademark dilution situations.


313. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
314. See supra, Introduction.
315. The junior user’s reason for using the senior mark is primarily
commercial – American Standard is not selling toilets to make a statement, it
is selling toilets to make money, and using Cadillac’s mark to make more
money. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
316. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906 (emphasis added).
317. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
318. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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IV.CONCLUSION

****

In cases like Am. Dairy Queen, Nabisco, Mattel and the
hypothetical Cadillac v. American Standard, it is evident that
detailed analysis of the intersection between the speech at
issue and the FTDA is required because there could be
instances where some non-commercial speech does not deserve
protection under the First Amendment. This view is premised
on (1) a theory that Congress attempted to protect the propertylike interests in trademarks; (2) a theory that the tension
between the FTDA and the First Amendment is reduced by the
FTDA’s requirements of famousness and distinctiveness; (3)
that commercial speech deserves less protection than noncommercial speech; and (4) that the FTDA advances a
substantial government interest and can therefore regulate
some forms of speech. This involves a critical balancing of
rights between the expression involved and the mark holder’s
property-like interest. While this comment does not dispute
that expressive rights are powerful and should rarely be
curtailed, there are instances where protecting valued
commercial resources should be a judicial priority, as they have
been a legislative priority. Without such protection, the
incentive to invest in a mark’s distinctiveness is diminished.
Consequently, the value society attributes to that mark, and to
future marks, will be reduced. This reduction in value may
have adverse consequences on the consumer public because the
average cost of goods and services may increase. Consumers
will be forced to pay premiums in order to guarantee quality,
and by definition those premiums will include the mechanism
to accommodate the business’s expense in finding alternate
methods of reaching out to new customers. Thus, the FTDA’s
accommodation of limited dilution rights against defendants
who genuinely have little or no non-commercial expression will
respect legitimate First Amendment values, promote expansion
in property wealth and generally expand the number of entities
that generate some form of alternative public commentary.


**** “After this remarkably long walk on a short legal pier . . . the [author] has
endeavored . . . out of its own sense of morbid curiosity, to resolve what it
perceived to be the legal issue presented.” Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp.,
Inc 147 F. Supp. 2d 668, 672 (S.D.Tex. 2001) (Kent, District Judge,
demonstrating again the importance of humor in legal analysis).

